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JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(i), this Court has 
jurisdiction over "final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceedings originating with . . . the Public Service Commission 
. . ." The PSC's February 20, 1992, Order was a final order. 
Sandy City ("Sandy") and White City Water Company ("WCWC") 
(collectively referred to as "Petitioners") filed a Petition for 
Review and/or Reconsideration with the PSC on March 11, 1992, and 
that Petition was denied on April 8, 1992. (R. 389). Having thus 
exhausted their administrative remedies, Petitioners filed an 
appeal with this Court. (R. 394). Despite this, Petitioners claim 
that this Court does not have jurisdiction and that the PSC's order 
was not final. The PSC's decision concerning its jurisdiction was 
final and this Court has been asked to consider the PSC's decision. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. WAS IT APPROPRIATE FOR THE PSC TO HAVE RETAINED 
JURISDICTION OVER THE WHITE CITY WATER USERS? 
A. DO APPLICABLE STATUTES AND CONTROLLING CASE LAW 
ALLOW THE PSC TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER WCWC 
AND ITS PROPOSED PURCHASER, SANDY? 
B. DOES UTAH'S CONSTITUTION ALLOW THE PSC TO EXERCISE 
JURISDICTION OVER SANDY IF IT PURCHASES WCWC? 
C. WOULD SANDY'S SALE OF WATER TO NON-RESIDENT WATER 
USERS BE A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION? 
D. WAS THE PSC CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
ACQUISITION OF WCWC AND THE SALE OF WATER TO NON-
SANDY RESIDENTS WAS NOT THE SALE OF "SURPLUS" 
WATER? 
II. DID THE PSC BASE ITS DECISION UPON LEGAL AND FACTUAL 
EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM THE PARTIES? 
III. IS THE PSC'S ORDER FINAL? 
1 
STANDARD OF APPEI*LATE REVIEW 
In its review process, this Court is entitled to consider the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the PSC and the 
administrative record. Even the cases cited1 by Petitioners allow 
this Court to consider the PSC's decision and the underlying 
record. Relying upon the cases cited by Petitioners, significant 
deference should be given to the PSC. Since there is more than one 
permissible readiji(g_jaf__the applicable statutes and no basis in the 
statutory or legislative history to prefer one interpretation over 
another, the PSC is entitled to deference. Salt Lake City v. 
Confer. 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983). As the Utah Supreme Court said 
in Morton International. Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1991), 
. . . an appellate court should not substitute its 
judgment for the agency's judgment concerning the wisdom of 
the agency's policy. Where there is no discernible 
legislative intent concerning a specific issue the 
legislature, has in effect, left the issue unresolved. In 
such a case, it is appropriate to conclude that the 
legislature has delegated authority to the agency to decide 
the issue. Such an approach is particularly appropriate when 
it is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended the 
agency to have some discretion in dealing with the statutory 
provision at issue. 
Id. at 589. 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Actf which governed 
the proceedings before the PSC, the applicable standard of review 
is "substantial evidence." 
1
 MCI v. Public Service Commission, 286 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 
(1992); Savage Industries Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 
P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); Morton International Inc. v. Auditing 
Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioners began the process before the PSC by entering into 
an October 8, 1992, agreement wherein Sandy would acquire the stock 
of WCWC and would provide water service to WCWC customers. (R. 
79). As a pre-condition to the closing, the PSC had to relinquish 
jurisdiction over Sandy's service of water to non-resident 
customers. (R. 79). In furtherance of this pre-condition, 
Petitioners filed an Application with the PSC on or about October 
31, 1992, formally requesting the PSC to relinquish jurisdiction. 
(R. 79). The PSC gathered factual information and legal memoranda 
on this issue and then concluded that it had to retain jurisdiction 
in order to protect the rights of the non-resident White City Water 
Users. (R. 302). Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
and after consideration the PSC denied the Motion. (R. 360-388). 
Petitioners then filed an appeal with this Court and sought a 
summary disposition of the matter. This request was denied. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the heart of this case is Sandy's attempt to acquire WCWC, 
a utility currently regulated by the PSC, absent accountability to 
the PSC or to its water users concerning rates it will charge these 
customers. The affected water users reside outside the political 
boundaries of incorporated Sandy and have no power to affect Sandy 
decision-makers at the polls. In the past, these water users could 
seek redress before the PSC. Sandy has sought to eliminate this 
historic avenue from these residents by conditioning its purchase 
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of WCWC on the PSC's agreement not to retain jurisdiction over the 
sale of water to these water users. 
The PSC specifically rejected this attempt by Sandy, stating 
that it would retain jurisdiction in order to protect the rights of 
the White City Water Users. Sandy has asserted it was 
inappropriate for the PSC to retain jurisdiction based upon the 
claim that by operation of the contract of sale, Sandy would 
somehow be supplying "surplus" water to WCWC customers. However, 
Sandy would not be acquiring "surplus" water, it would be acquiring 
the water rights of an existing water company, water rights whose 
beneficial use was made by the very customers Sandy seeks to 
disenfranchise. Furthermore, a municipality may sell "surplus" 
water outside its boundaries which it does not need, but it is not 
obligated, nor may it be required to do so for the long term. If 
Sandy were selling "surplus" water, then the White City Water Users 
have no guarantee of the continued service they currently receive 
from WCWC. They would be trading a stable, guaranteed source of 
supply for a contingent one, subject to the whims and caprices of 
a political entity over which they have no control. 
Sandy also claims that the PSC should have taken more evidence 
on whether the sale was in the public interest. As the PSC 
appropriately determined, the issues of jurisdiction and public 
interest concerning the ultimate advisability of the sale are 
separate and distinct. Even if the sale was determined to be in 
the public interest, it does not follow that the PSC should give up 
jurisdiction to regulate rates charged by Sandy. A sale initially 
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in the public interest could immediately become offensive if there 
is no mechanism in place to limit rates Sandy can charge these 
customers or to ensure continued water supply over the long term. 
Sandy has already admitted it will charge higher rates to the WCWC 
water users than are charged to customers within the incorporated 
areas. 1/15/92 Sandy Memorandum at p. 4. 
The truth is that absent PSC control, Sandy would have the 
ability to charge these captive water users outrageously high rates 
without fear of reprisal. Of equal importance is the salient fact 
that Sandy voluntarily conditioned its purchase of WCWC upon the 
PSC's decision to relinquish jurisdiction. This event did not 
occur. Unless the contract is amended, there will be no sale, 
public interest or not. On that basis, the PSC's decision 
represents a significant savings of time and effort for all 
concerned. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The geographical area served by WCWC is contiguous to and 
lies partly within Sandy and partly within the unincorporated area 
of Salt Lake County. 
2. Of the 3,650 customers currently served by WCWC, 42% (or 
1533) of the customers are located within the municipal boundaries 
of Sandy and 58% (or 2117) are located in Salt Lake County outside 
Sandy's municipal boundaries. 
3. On or about October 8, 1991, Petitioners entered into a 
contractual arrangement wherein Sandy would acquire the stock of 
WCWC and would provide water service to WCWC customers. (R. 79). 
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4. Article VII of the contract stated that prior to closing: 
The PSC shall have issued an order which has become final 
and non-appealable, acceptable to the City, in its sole 
discretion, including at least the following: 
(a) authorizing the sale of the Shares by the 
Shareholders of the Authority; 
(b) confirming that subsequent to the Closing the PSC 
will not have jurisdiction over the rates, fees, charges, 
services or practices of the Company, the Authority or the 
City as a result of the purchase of the Shares of the 
Authority, or the lease of the System by the City under the 
Lease and Assignment; and 
(c) contain no restrictions or conditions on possible 
reorganizations of the Company, including a requirement to 
liquidate the Company. (R. 79). 
5. In furtherance of the contract, WCWC filed an Application 
with the PSC on or about October 31, 1991. (R. 79). The 
Application sought approval from the PSC of the October 8, 1991, 
contract between WCWC and Sandy, by which Sandy would acquire the 
stock of WCWC. (R. 79). The Application also sought a 
determination by the PSC that it would not retain jurisdiction over 
WCWC after it was acquired by Sandy, by asking that the PSC approve 
the contract and find that the integrated system constitutes a 
municipal water system . . . (R. 79; Application at p. 7). WCWC is 
currently regulated by the PSC pursuant to a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity No. 1121 is sued on May 11, 1955. (R. 
80; Application at p. 2). 
6. The Application further stated that WCWC had attempted to 
"get permission to construct additional storage facilities on 
property which it owns in Sandy City and which is of sufficient 
elevation to provide adequate pressure," but that Sandy "has been 
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unwilling to grant a variance from zoning ordinances to permit the 
construction of such storage facilities ..." (R. 79; Application 
at p. at 5). 
7. On November 7, 1991, Sandy filed a Petition to Intervene 
in the matter. (R. 143). A Petition to Intervene was filed by the 
White City Water Users on November 26, 1991, and by Salt Lake 
County on December 26, 1991. (R. 150; R. 164). All of these 
parties were allowed to intervene and comprise the parties before 
the PSC and this Court. (R. 158). 
8. By a January 10, 1992, Order, the PSC set up a discovery 
schedule and requested that the parties submit briefs addressing 
the legal authority of the PSC to oversee rates charged to WCWC 
customers if Sandy were to acquire WCWC. (R. 164). 
9. On or about January 15, 1992, Sandy filed a Memorandum of 
Law Concerning Commission's Jurisdiction. In the Memorandum, Sandy 
stated that it anticipated providing service to customers within 
its city limits at the same rate, but that: 
. . . As with other non-resident customers of Sandy City, the 
White City customers not residing within the city limits will 
be charged higher rates than those charged to Sandy residents 
to reflect the fact that those non-resident customers are not 
a part of Sandy City's tax base and to reflect the cost to 
Sandy City of acquiring the system and providing service to 
those customers. . . . 
(R. 175 to 300; Memorandum at pp. 3-4) (emphasis added). 
10. On February 18, 1992, the PSC heard oral arguments and 
two days later issued an Order Severing Proceeding and Report and 
Order. The PSC's decision was based upon legal memoranda and 
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factual evidence from the parties, as well as the oral arguments 
heard on February 18, 1992. (R. 302; Order at p. 2). 
11. In its Order, the PSC declared that it "has jurisdiction 
over a municipality to the extent it provides retail water service 
outside its boundaries as a general business." (R. 341-343; Order 
at p. 1). 
12. Among other things, this decision was based upon the 
PSC's determination that Sandy's proposal "would leave a number of 
customers, who have had recourse to the Commission for grievances, 
effectively without recourse to any entity, public or private. 
Given that stark fact, we refuse to take the *all or nothing' 
choice presented by Applicant. . . . " (R. 341-343; Order at p. at 
3-4). 
13. The PSC in its Order further stated that: 
. . . In reaching this conclusion, we believe the salient 
considerations include disenfranchisement of the extra-
territorial customers, Sandy's limited statutory powers, the 
structure of the transaction, our doubts that service outside 
the city boundaries would constitute exercise of a municipal 
function, and our skepticism that Sandy would indeed be 
selling surplus water as contemplated by the Utah statutes. 
(R. 341-343; Order at p. 4). 
14. On March 11, 1992, Sandy filed a Petition for Review 
and/or Reconsideration with the PSC and brief in support thereof. 
(R. 360-388). 
15. On April 8, 1992, the PSC issued an Order Denying Review 
because the "... Petitions for review and/or rehearing, submitted 
by the Applicant [WCWC] and Intervenor, Sandy City Corporation, 
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raise no issues we have not already considered . . ." (R. 389; 
Order at p. 1). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PSC HAS APPROPRIATELY RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER THE 
WHITE CITY WATER USERS 
Sandy conditioned its purchase of WCWC upon the PSC's decision 
not to retain jurisdiction over the White City Water Users and 
approached the PSC with this request. It was Sandy who selected 
the rules for the game. By electing to proceed as it did, Sandy 
had no guarantees that the PSC would decide in its favor. Now that 
the PSC has elected to retain jurisdiction in opposition to Sandy's 
request, Sandy has appealed the PSC's decision to this Court. 
Contrary to Petitioners7 suggestions, it is common practice 
for courts and administrative agencies to make a determination of 
jurisdiction before ever reaching other matters. Petitioners have 
blended jurisdiction with other issues in an attempt avoid this 
basic flaw of their position. The PSC's decision to retain 
jurisdiction is well reasoned, well researched and evidences its 
careful consideration of all memoranda and evidence presented to 
it# including that from Sandy and WCWC 
A. Applicable Statutes and Controlling Case Law Allow 
the PSC to Exercise Jurisdiction Over WCWC and its 
Proposed Purchaser, Sandy 
In their Brief, Petitioners claim that the PSC is a "creature 
of the legislature" and is limited to "powers specifically 
delegated to it by statute." Petitioners' Brief at 14. This is 
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true, but Petitioners are in the same position. Their powers are 
circumscribed by statute as well. 
In deciding to retain jurisdiction, the PSC concluded that it 
would proceed "on the premise that if Sandy takes over the utility 
service of [WCWC]
 # the city must also take on the utility/s 
obligations." 2/20/92 PSC Order at p. 5. As the Utah Supreme 
Court said in North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co. , 
223 P.2d 577 (Utah 1950), North Salt Lake, the condemnor of a water 
company, was required to take on the obligations imposed upon the 
water company. In their Brief, Petitioners misconstrue the 
propositions of that case which were relied upon by the PSC. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court in North Salt Lake, supra. ". 
. . when the town condemned the entire system of the water company, 
the rights and privileges that extended to, and the obligations 
imposed upon the water company were carried over and the town is 
required to meet those obligations. . . . " Id. at 583. Here, 
Sandy is attempting to acquire all of the benefits of WCWC absent 
accountability to those water users for the rates it charges. If 
Sandy takes over a PSC regulated utility and services non-resident 
customers, regulation by the PSC should continue. 
Similarly, in City of Orangeburg v. Moss. 204 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 
1974), the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of legislation empowering the PSC to regulate 
extra-territorial service. The Court concluded that the PSC had 
jurisdiction to regulate a municipality operating electrical 
facilities outside it boundaries. In reaching this conclusion that 
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court determined the constitutional grant of power to 
municipalities to operate electrical facilities was not a 
limitation on the power of the State to regulate those activities, 
whether through the PSC or otherwise. 
Petitioners have attempted to negate the importance of the 
Orangeburg ruling by stating that South Carolina had legislation in 
place allowing the PSC to regulate extra-territorial service by a 
municipality. The case, however, is of great significance because 
the South Carolina Supreme Court was considering whether it was 
constitutional for the PSC to have jurisdiction over extra-
territorial service by the PSC# which is precisely the issue 
presented to the Court in the instant appeal. As the Utah Supreme 
Court stated in Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P. 2d 119 
(Utah 1977), neither the Utah legislature by statute, nor Utah 
judges through case law, have determined whether the PSC may 
regulate extra-territorial service by a municipality. Id. at 122. 
Petitioners have consistently claimed that Utah law prohibits the 
PSC from regulating Sandy in this situation, but this is 
inaccurate. There has yet to be a decision on this issue. 
Petitioners7 Brief shows a lack of respect for the PSC's 
authority to protect customers and demonstrates the need for that 
protection to continue. The PSC has statutory authority to 
regulate public utilities and to take necessary measures to carry 
out its duties to protect consumers. As the Utah Supreme Court 
stated in the case of White River Shale Oil v. Public Service 
Commission. 700 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1985): 
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The PSC has been charged with the responsibility of 
regulating utilities in the public interest and has 
considerable latitude of discretion to carry out that 
responsibility. Under the authority of U.C.A., 1953, 
§54-4-1 (Supp. 1983), the PSC has the power to issue 
orders regarding any matter within its jurisdiction 
[footnotes omitted]. 
Id. at 1091 (emphasis added). 
The track record of Sandy demonstrates its willingness to 
charge higher rates to those located outside its municipal 
boundaries and that those rates are not necessarily based upon 
actual cost of service. Sandy has publicly indicated that the 
White City Water Users located outside of Sandy's municipal 
boundaries will experience a significant increase in their rates 
for the avowed purpose of assisting Sandy in retiring the bonds 
issued for the purchase of the assets of WCWC and to compensate 
Sandy simply because they are non-taxpayers. " . . . the White 
City customers not residing within the city limits will be charged 
higher rates than those charged to Sandy residents ..." Sandy's 
1/15/92, Memorandum of Law at p. 4. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Kearns-Tribune v. Public 
Service Commission, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah 1984) supports the PSC's 
decision to protect the White City Water Users from excessive rates 
charged by Sandy. According to the Utah Supreme Court, ". . . 
[a]ny activities of a utility that actually affect its rate 
structure would necessarily be subject to some degree to the PSC's 
broad supervisory powers in relation to rates. . . . " Id. at 860. 
Since Sandy has admitted the rates of non-resident White City Water 
Users will increase and that Sandy does not intend to allow for PSC 
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oversight of the rates, this proposed sale constitutes an activity 
that will affect the rate structure of this utility and therefore 
must be managed by the PSC. Given these facts, it is not 
unreasonable for Sandy to be regulated for rates charged to 
customers residing outside the city limits; in fact, it is quite 
desirable. 
B. The PSC is Not Prohibited by Utah's Constitution 
From Exercising Jurisdiction Over Sandy if it 
Purchases WCWC 
It is true that Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah 
Constitution limits the authority of the Legislature to delegate 
powers of a municipality to a special commission. This provision, 
however, does not prohibit the PSC from regulating a municipality 
that acquires a regulated entity that serves customers located 
outside its municipal boundaries. That constitutional provision 
provides that: 
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, any power 
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal 
improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in 
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol 
site, or to perform any municipal functions. 
Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 28. 
In support of their claim that Article VI, Section 28 
prohibits the PSC from regulating Sandy after it purchases WCWC, a 
currently regulated facility, Petitioners inappropriately rely upon 
County Water System v. Salt Lake County. 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954). 
That case concerned a lawsuit by a water corporation seeking a 
declaration that Salt Lake City must be regulated by the PSC in 
selling and distributing water beyond its city limits. County 
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Water. supra. and the present case are distinguishable. In County 
Water, Salt Lake City was acquiring water for the present and 
future needs of its residents. In the instant case# Sandy is 
acquiring WCWC in order that it may continue to serve water to the 
White City Water Users. It will not be providing surplus water 
that its residents do not need, but rather Sandy will be taking 
over an existing water company and serving its customers. 
Furthermore, Sandy's refusal to allow WCWC to construct additional 
storage facilities on property which WCWC owns in Sandy appears to 
be one of the reasons WCWC agreed to sell its facilities to Sandy. 
WCWC's 10/31/91, Application at p. 5. 
The more recent case, Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 
P.2d 119 (Utah 1977), makes Petitioners mistaken reliance upon 
County Water even more clear. According to the Utah Supreme Court 
in Salt Lake County, supra, it is not certain to what "extent a 
city may engage in rendering a utility service outside its city 
limits without being subject to some public regulation. . . " Id. 
at 122. It is true that the PSC cannot regulate a city's utility 
service within its boundaries, but contrary to Petitioners' 
statements, the Utah Supreme Court has not determined whether the 
PSC may regulate a municipality acquiring a regulated entity 
outside its municipal boundaries. Id. at 121-122. 
Given the underlying circumstances of the present case and the 
applicable statutes, the PSC appropriately determined it had 
authority to regulate Sandy after it acquired WCWC, a regulated 
utility. 
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C. Sandy's Sale to Non-Resident Water Users is Not a 
Municipal Function 
Sandy's proposed service to extra-territorial customers is not 
a municipal function, particularly in light of the circumstances 
underlying this case. Sandy would be selling water to customers 
outside its municipal boundaries; has admitted that it will charge 
higher rates to WCWC customers; and conditioned its contract with 
WCWC upon the PSC not retaining jurisdiction over Sandy. 10/31/91 
Application of WCWC at p. 5; 1/15/92, Memorandum at p. 4; 10/8/91, 
Contract at Article VII. 
Given this information, it is clear that Sandy contemplates 
providing water service to the White City Water Users as a business 
proposition and not as an incident to the water service of that 
municipality. Thus, the acquisition and ultimate service outside 
of the municipal boundaries of Sandy cannot be construed as a 
"municipal function" so as to place it within the exemption sought 
by Petitioners and to concomitantly avoid PSC regulation. 
Several recent Utah cases have discussed the application of 
the term "municipal function" in similar contexts. Contrary to 
Petitioner's statements, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems 
v. Public Service Commission, 789 P.2d 298 (Utah 1990), is a case 
that must be considered in the analysis and which supports 
Appellees' rather than Petitioners' position. In that case, the 
Utah Supreme Court considered the claim of the Utah Associated 
Municipal Power Systems ("UAMPS") that Article VI, Section 28 of 
the Utah Constitution was violated when UAMPS, an entity composed 
of local government agencies, was required to obtain a certificate 
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of convenience and necessity from the PSC. UAMPS' aim was to 
construct generating and transmission facilities. Under the Utah 
Interlocal Co-operation Act (Utah Code Ann. §11-13-1 et seq.), 
UAMPS had the same power, privileges and authority accorded its 
individual political subdivisions. UAMPS resisted the jurisdiction 
of the PSC based upon the theory that these political subdivisions 
were exercising municipal functions, even though part of their 
service area was located outside the boundaries of the above-
mentioned political subdivisions. 
In deciding whether UAMPs was engaged in a municipal function, 
the Court stated that: 
The "function" we are considering here is not the 
mere construction of a transmission line by a utility 
owned by a single municipality to serve its own municipal 
customers. It is the construction of a transmission line 
by a political subdivision of the state that combines 
more than twenty cities, towns, and local agencies 
throughout the state of Utah for the purpose of 
generating, buying, and selling electricity across the 
state. * . . Moreover, UAMPS' proposed line is designed 
to open up new areas for the wholesaling of electricity 
to municipalities now served by UP&L, with possibly 
severe economic consequences for UP&L and its customers 
statewide. We have little difficulty finding that the 
construction of this line by UAMPS is "sufficiently 
infused with a state, as opposed to an exclusively local, 
interest to escape characterization as [a] *municipal 
function[]'." (citations omitted). 
789 P.2d at 302 (citing City of West Jordan. 767 P.2d at 534). 
In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that PSC jurisdiction must be 
imposed due to the potential detrimental effect upon those beyond 
the boundaries of municipalities and for the reason that the State 
and the PSC had a better ability than any municipality to consider 
the interests of all those outside the boundaries who may be 
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adversely affected by the project. A similar problem is posed in 
the instant matter. 
The Supreme Court rejected UAMPS' interpretation of Article 
VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution since UAMPS was "defining 
anything having to do with the operation of a municipal utility as 
a %municipal function,' the performance of which is beyond the 
reach of state regulation. . . . Id. at 301. Petitioners have 
incorrectly attempted to reach a like result.. 
In UAMPS, supra, the court determined that the construction of 
the proposed power lines by UAMPS had far reaching impacts beyond 
the boundaries of UAMPS' members and that the PSC was in the best 
position to consider the interests of customers outside the 
boundaries. Id. at 303. The same is true in the instant case. 
The PSC is in the best position to consider and protect the 
interests of Sandy's extra-territorial water customers. The PSC 
would not interfere with Sandy's day-to-day management of WCWC, but 
would provide a forum for the non-resident customers' complaints 
and act as a necessary watchdog of Sandy's activities. Without the 
PSC, these customers would have no recourse to protect themselves 
from rates charged by Sandy or from other service problems. 
Ironically, Petitioners have attempted to distinguish UAMPS by 
stating that UAMPS was required by statute to obtain PSC approval, 
while in the instant case, the PSC is "excluded" by statutefrom 
" exer c ising—jurisdiction oveiL_Jthe—sale—of—surplus—water_ b^ 
municipalities^" Petitioners' Brief at 26. The facts, however, 
rebut these claims. First, Petitioners conditioned their contract 
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upon the PSC's decision not to retain jurisdiction over Sandy's 
acquisition of WCWC, a regulated utility. Second, by statute, WCWC 
is a PSC regulated utility and cannot discontinue service without 
following statutory mandates. Third, and contrary to Petitioners' 
statements, the PSC is not "excluded" by statute from exercising 
jurisdiction over Sandy. The Salt Lake County court, supra. makes 
it clear that there has been no definitive decision by the Utah 
Supreme Court on this issue. 570 P.2d at 122. 
Petitioners have further claimed that even if the UAMPS 
analysis is applicable, the PSC failed to apply the balancing 
approach outlined in the case. Petitioners' Brief at 26-27. 
Contrary to these claims, the PSC did balance the interests of 
Petitioners with those of the White City Water Users. The PSC 
simply ruled on the necessary pre-condition to the implementation 
of the contract between Sandy and WCWC. A balancing approach is 
not necessary for such a strict legal conclusion. 
The case of CP National Corporation v. Public Service 
Commission, 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981), further limits Sandy's 
authority outside its municipal boundaries. In that case, the Utah 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to review Utah Code Ann. §10-8-
14, concerning service beyond city limits, and County Water System 
v. Salt Lake County, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954). According to the CP 
National court, Section 10-8-14, 
. authorizes cities to construct, maintain and 
operate electric light works and authorizes them to sell 
and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of 
such works not required by the city or its inhabitants to 
other beyond the limits of the city. We believe that 
this language imposes a limitation on a city operating 
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outside its borders. It negates the proposition that a 
city could purposely engage in the distribution of power 
to localities or persons outside its limits except to 
dispose of surplus. County Water System v. Salt Lake 
City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P.2d 285 (1954). In the instant 
case, the municipalities intend to continue to serve a 
large area outside any of their limits. . . . 
Section 10-8-14 does not contemplate nor authorize 
a city to so operate its electric light and power works, 
There is good justification for this limitation since 
municipally owned utilities are not subject to the 
jurisdiction and supervision of the Public Service 
Commission, but are controlled solely by the 
administration of the city or town wherein they are 
located . . . Customers who are non-residents of the 
municipalities would be left at the mercy of officials 
over whom they have no control at the ballot box, and 
they could not turn to the Public Service Commission for 
relief. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Id. at 524. 
It is for precisely these reasons that the PSC is entitled to and 
must retain jurisdiction over any actions of Sandy outside of its 
municipal boundaries with respect to the service of the customers 
of WCWC. 
Petitioners erroneously claim that CP National v. Public 
Service Commission. 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981), strengthens their 
position that the sale of water by Sandy to non-residents should 
not be subject to PSC regulation. Petitioners' Brief at 29. The 
contrary is true. The CP National court stated that Utah Code 
Annotated Section 10-8-14 " . . . imposes a limitation on a city 
operating outside its borders. . . . " Jd. at 524. The court did 
not limit this holding to cities providing surplus electrical power 
service as Petitioners claimed, but rather expressed a general 
concern for non-resident customers who "would be left at the mercy 
of officials over whom they have no control at the ballot box, and 
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they could not turn to the [PSC] for relief. . . . " Id. at 524. 
This is a very real problem in the instant case and Sandy has done 
nothing to alleviate these concerns. 
D. The PSC Correctly Determined that the Acquisition 
of WCWC and the Sale of Water to Non-Sandy 
Residents Could Not be Considered "Surplus" Water 
The PSC was correct in determining that the water Sandy would 
acquire from the purchase of WCWC would not be surplus water. 
Contrary to Petitioners7 claims, the PSC took great care in its 
analysis of the definition of "surplus" water and stated the 
criteria it used for determining if the water sought to be 
purchased by Sandy would be "surplus." Petitioners7 Brief at 27-
28. The PSC reviewed Utah Code Annotated Section 10-8-14(1), 
County Water System v. Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954), 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1977), CP 
National Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 638 P.2d 519 
(Utah 1981), the underlying facts of the case and the memoranda of 
the parties in determining whether WCWC's water would be "surplus" 
water of Sandy. 
Sandy claims to be purchasing WCWC in order that it may 
provide more efficient water service to the WCWC customers, many of 
which are outside the municipal boundaries. The PSC's conclusion 
that the water would not be "surplus is therefore a sound one which 
is based upon applicable law and fact. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§10-8-14(1), 
[The board of commissioners and city council's of cities] 
may construct, maintain and operate waterworks, sewer 
collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works, electric 
light works, telephone lines or public transportation 
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systems, or authorize the construction, maintenance and 
operation of the same by others, or purchase or lease 
such works or systems from any person or corporation, and 
they may sell and deliver the surplus product or service 
capacity of any such works, not required bv the city or 
its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city, 
(emphas is added). 
The key phrase is when "not required by the city or its 
inhabitants . . ." Under Sandy's theory, the White City Water 
Users would not be guaranteed water service for the long term. The 
plain definition of surplus—fl[a]n amount or quantity in excess of 
what is needed"2—shows the weakness in Petitioners' argument. 
Two Utah Supreme Court cases have addressed the issue of 
"surplus water" in situations related, but not identical to the 
facts before the Commission in this action. In County Water 
System v. Salt Lake City. 278 P. 2d 285 (Utah 1954), County Water 
Systems, a public utility regulated by the PSC, was furnishing 
water in an area just south of the Salt Lake City limits. County 
Water System sought a declaratory judgment challenging the right of 
Salt Lake City to supply water to the same general area absent PSC 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled that the PSC did not have 
jurisdiction for the reason that the water being sold was surplus 
product as an incident to the present and reasonably to be 
anticipated future needs of the City as contemplated by Utah Code 
Ann. §10-8-14. The same is not true in the instant case. 
In the Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 
1977), case, the Supreme Court again embraced the concept that 
water furnished by the City incidental to its water serving 
2
 American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition. 
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activities for its residents would not be subject to PSC 
jurisdiction• However, the Supreme Court left open the question 
concerning the extent to which a city may engage in rendering a 
utility service outside its city limits absent public regulation. 
In light of these cases, it is clear that the exemptions sought by 
Sandy and WCWC must be based upon the provision of surplus water as 
an incident to Sandy's municipal water service function, or they 
must accede to the jurisdiction of the PSC. 
The instant fact situation is far beyond that limited 
exemption. What Petitioners are attempting to do is to allow for 
the transfer of the assets and the termination of regulation by the 
PSC of an existing public utility, which has 58% of its connections 
located outside the municipal boundaries of Sandy. The water is 
not surplus water to Sandy, nor can it suddenly and magically be 
considered surplus water simply due to Sandy's contractual 
acquisition of the assets of WCWC. Absorbing the obligation to 
serve 58% of an existing company the size of WCWC is hardly an act 
incidental to the municipal function of the Sandy water department, 
especially in view of the fact that Sandv is purposefully acquiring 
an existing public utility. 
II. THE PSC TOOK BOTH LEGAL AND FACTUAL EVIDENCE FROM ALL 
PARTIES AND MADE ITS DECISION BASED UPON THAT INFORMATION 
Petitioners repeatedly claim the PSC made its decision without 
taking any evidence in the matter, but the record demonstrates 
otherwise. The PSC received multiple legal memoranda from all of 
the parties and at its request was given documentation from 
Petitioners Sandy and WCWC in support of their position. 
22 
Petitioners own "Statement of Facts" in their Brief prove that they 
presented the PSC with documentation in support of their position. 
As the PSC correctly stated in its February 20, 1992, Order, 
WCWC's application was filed on November 4, 1991. On December 9, 
1991, a prehearing conference was held where the parties were asked 
to brief the issues; the parties briefed the issues and oral 
arguments were held on February 18, 1992. Jd. at 2. The PSC made 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support its decision. 
Because the PSC did not "rubber stamp" the necessary pre-
condition to their contract (that the PSC not retain jurisdiction), 
Petitioners seek to undermine the process (which they initiated) 
and the findings and conclusions of the PSC. Petitioners have 
claimed that "there is no evidence in the record to support [the 
PSC's] findings, but fail to state what is inaccurate about the 
findings. Petitioners7 Brief at 33. These findings are based 
upon documentation and evidence provided by Petitioners. 
Petitioners have further claimed that the process was 
"unfair," but offer no evidence to support that contention. The 
analysis contained in the PSC's February 20, 1992, Order supports 
the conclusion that the PSC carefully considered the evidence 
before it, as well as the facts and the legal arguments on both 
sides. Petitioners do not like the result, but offer no credible 
evidence or rationale to suggest the result should be altered. 
It was proper for the PSC to bifurcate the process and to 
decide that it had jurisdiction to regulate Sandy. The question of 
jurisdiction to regulate a municipality was not factually intensive 
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and the facts underlying this issue were undisputed. The PSC 
appropriately requested and received legal memoranda from all 
parties concerning the legal issues of this dispute. 
The administrative process, which Petitioners initiated, has 
been fair and in keeping with procedural and constitutional 
mandates. The PSC took appropriate evidence, considered legal 
memoranda, gave the parties opportunity for oral argument, and made 
proper findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which its Order 
was based. On that basis, Petitioners7 complaints are groundless 
and unfounded. 
III. THE PSC'S ORDER IS FINAL 
Petitioners have claimed that the PSC's Order is not final. 
Again, this is contrary to the record below and to the case law 
defining "final." Petitioners conditioned their contract on the 
PSC's initial decision not to retain jurisdiction and voluntarily 
submitted that request to the PSC. This issue was decided by the 
PSC, reconsidered by the PSC and represents a final order presented 
to this Court for consideration. 
A. The PSC's Order is Final With Respect to Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b): 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court 
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 
In the absence of such determination and direction, any order 
or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate 
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the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order 
or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and 
the rights and liabilities of the parties. 
The first question is whether this rule even applies to the 
instant case. Petitioners approached the PSC with a request that 
PSC not retain jurisdiction over Sandy after it purchased WCWC. 
This was a condition precedent of the contract of sale between 
Sandy and WCWC. The PSC decided to retain jurisdiction. 
Petitioners asked the PSC to re-consider its decision. The PSC re-
considered its decision and upheld its earlier decision. 
None of the Rule 54 cases cited by Petitioners concern appeals 
from administrative agencies. They involve appeals from district 
court decisions. As Salt Lake County convincingly argues in its 
February 11, 1993, Brief to this Court, the requirements of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") apply, not Rule 54 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under UAPA, the standard of 
review is the "whole record" or "substantial evidence" test. Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Even if it were assumed there is more than one issue to be 
resolved at this time (e.g. the question of public interest) and 
Rule 54 is applicably, the PSC has made a final, appealable 
decision on the issue of jurisdiction to regulate Sandy. Unless 
the terms of the contract between Sandy and WCWC are changed to 
allow for PSC jurisdiction, Petitioners only remaining recourse is 
before this Court on appeal. Further proceedings before the PSC 
are unnecessary and wasteful. 
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The cases cited by Petitioners fail to support their claim 
that the PSC's decision was not final. For instance, Petitioners 
cite First Security Bank v. Conlin. 817 P.2d 298 (Utah 1991) for 
the proposition that "the Utah Court of Appeals3 held that it did 
not have jurisdiction over one claim that had been tried separately 
because other related claims remained below." Petitioners Brief at 
35. However, the holding in Conlin. supra. was that since the 
trial court's order adjudicated the rights of fewer than all of the 
parties, it was not final. Conlin. therefore, has no application 
to the instant case. 
The other cases cited by Petitioners in favor of their claim 
of lack of finality also fail to support their position. In Olsen 
v. Salt Lake City School District. 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986), for 
instance, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a ruling which 
left an underlying claim for relief unresolved as to a particular 
party was not final as to that party. Petitioners cite to this 
case for the proposition that the terminology used to describe an 
order cannot change its fundamental character. Petitioners' Brief 
at 36. The proposition is correct, but works against Petitioners' 
position. A careful review of the fundamental character of the 
PSC's order establishes its finality. 
Petitioners further claim that the order cannot be final 
because the operative facts are "identical to those involved in the 
contract issue pending before the Commission. ..." Petitioners' 
3
 This is a Utah Supreme Court case not a Court of Appeals 
case. 
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Brief at 37. This statement again ignores the key conditions 
within the agreement drafted by Petitioners—absent a PSC decision 
to abandon jurisdiction, there is no contract. Without the 
contract, the issue of whether the sale is in the public interest 
is moot. The PSC's Order is therefore final since all relevant 
issues have been resolved. 
CONCLUSION 
The simple question before this Court is whether it was 
appropriate for the PSC to retain jurisdiction over the White City 
Water Users after Sandy's purchase of WCWC, a PSC regulated 
utility. Petitioners have attempted to confuse this issue by 
raising questions as to whether the sale of WCWC to Sandy is in the 
public interest and by suggesting those issues must be resolved by 
the PSC in this factual situation. As the PSC appropriately 
decided, those issues are irrelevant to the issue of whether the 
PSC should retain jurisdiction over WCWC's customers. 
By conditioning the contract for Sandy's purchase of WCWC upon 
PSC approval, Petitioners created the rules of the game and 
suggested the ultimate timing for resolution of the jurisdictional 
issue. Because the PSC rejected their request, Petitioners seek to 
undermine the PSC's decision to retain jurisdiction to protect the 
White City Water Users from excessive rates. Unfortunately, 
Petitioners have failed to offer a viable alternative whereby the 
White City Water Users would have an effective method of contesting 
rates charged by Sandy. This action only solidifies the 
correctness of the PSC's decision. The White City Water Users do 
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not reside within incorporated Sandy and, therefore, have no power 
at the polls. Absent PSC jurisdiction, those customers would have 
no means of protecting themselves from excessive rates charged by 
Sandy or from other problems relating to water service. Such a 
result is not contemplated by applicable law and is contrary to 
public policy. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 16th day of February, 1993. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE VI §28 
Sec 28 [Special privileges forbidden j 
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
§54(b) 
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Tab 3 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§54-4-1 
54-4-1. General jurisdiction. 
The commission is hereby vested with power and 
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public 
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the busi-
ness of every such public utility in this state, and to 
do all things, whether herein specifically designated 
or in addition thereto, which are necessary or conve-
nient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction; 
provided, however, that the Department of Transpor-
tation shall have jurisdiction over those safety func-
tions transferred to it by the Department of Transpor-
tation Act. 1975 
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Tab 5 
— BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH — 
In the Matter of the Application 
of WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY for 
Commission Approval of a Contract 
Entered into on the 8th Day of 
October, 1991, Under Which Contract 
Sandy City and the Municipal Build-
ing Authority of Sandy City, Utah, 
Will Purchase All of the Out-
standing Stock of WHITE CITY WATER 
COMPANY. 
DOCKET NO. 91-018-02 
ORDER SEVERING PROCEEDING 
AND 
REPORT AND ORDER 
SYNOPSIS 
ISSUED: February 20, 1992 
Applicant, a certificated water corporation, seeks approval of 
the sale of all its stock to a local governmental entity and the 
assumption of service to its present customers by a municipal 
corporation. Applicant further asks the Commission to declare it has 
no jurisdiction over the municipality's subsequent water service 
operations insofar as they relate to Applicant's customers residing 
outside the municipal boundaries. We deem the jurisdictional 
question of such importance that it should be resolved before 
inquiring whether the transfer is in the public interest. 
Accordingly, we sever the prayer for declaratory relief from the 
balance of the proceeding and declare the Commission has jurisdiction 
over a municipality to the extent it provides retail water service 
outside its boundaries as a general business. 
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Gerald E. Nielson, Deputy 
County Attorney, Salt Lake 
Michael Ginsberg 
Laurie Noda 
Assistant Attorneys General 
White City Water Users, 
et al, 
Intervenor 
Salt Lake County, 
Intervenor 
Division of Public Util-
ities, Utah Department of 
Commerce, 
Intervenor 
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By the Commission: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The application in this matter was filed November 4, 1991. The 
Commission conducted a prehearing conference December 9, 1991, and 
asked the parties to brief the issues of the Commission's 
jurisdiction to approve the contract which is the subject of these 
proceedings and, should the contract be approved, the Commission's 
jurisdiction over Sandy City in connection with water customers 
residing outside the city. Oral arguments were heard by the 
Commission on February 18, 1992. Having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Commission enters the following Report and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Applicant is a water corporation certificated by this 
Commission. In its Application, Applicant seeks approval of a 
transfer of all its outstanding stock to an instrumentality of 
Sandy City Corporation, (hereafter "Sandy") a Utah municipal 
corporation. Applicant further seeks declaratory relief in the 
form of a Commission declaration that "the integrated system 
constitutes a municipal water system under the laws of the 
State of Utah." 
2. Under the proposed contract terms, the stock would be 
transferred to the Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City 
(hereafter "the Authority"). Applicant would retain its 
corporate existence for the lifetime of the bonds issued by the 
Authority to finance the purchase. 
3. Applicant would cease operating the system and, for a nominal 
rental, would lease the system to the Authority, which in turn 
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would sublease to Sandy. Sandy would actually operate the 
system and, to the extent feasible, would integrate Applicant's 
present system with Sandy's municipal system. Payment to the 
bondholders would be made by the Authority out of rentals 
realized from the sublease to Sandy, which in turn proposes to 
pay the rental fees out of water charges to customers. 
4. In its brief, Sandy states explicitly that customers residing 
outside the city limits will be charged more than those 
residing within. The stated rationale is that the customers 
outside the city limits should bear a greater proportion of the 
costs of the acquisition. 
5. In the contract, the stock transfer is specifically conditioned 
upon this Commission's final Order declaring that the 
Commission does not have and will not assert any jurisdiction 
over Sandy, whether in regard to customers residing inside or 
outside the city limits. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As we view it, Applicant seeks two separate and distinct forms 
of relief—approval, per se, of the contract, and declaratory relief 
in regard to the Commission's jurisdiction. We deem the declaratory 
branch of the proceeding so important that it should be severed from 
the approval branch. 
The subject transaction differs from other transfers hitherto 
considered by the Commission in that the transfer is to an entity 
arguably outside Commission jurisdiction. It would leave a number of 
customers, who have had recourse to the Commission for grievances, 
effectively without recourse to any entity, public or private. Given 
no A o 
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that stark fact, we refuse to take the "all or nothing" choice 
presented by Applicant. Instead, we propose to resolve the 
jurisdictional issue in this proceeding, with the docket number in 
the caption above, as a matter separate from the contract approval. 
In light of our action in this proceeding, Applicant may choose to 
proceed or not in the approval action. 
We turn now to the merits of the jurisdictional issue. 
We concede at the outset that we have no authority to regulate 
a municipality within its boundaries. However, we conclude that case 
law, statutory law, and public policy support our authority to 
regulate Sandy's water service outside its boundaries. In reaching 
this conclusion, we believe the salient considerations include 
disenfranchisement of the extra-territorial customers, Sandy's 
limited statutory powers, the structure of the transaction, our 
doubts that service outside the city boundaries would constitute 
exercise of a municipal function, and our skepticism that Sandy would 
indeed be selling surplus water as contemplated by the Utah statutes. 
Disenfranchisement of the Customers 
At present, all of Applicant's customers, inside and outside 
the city limits, have recourse to the Commission to ensure just and 
reasonable rates. Absent our involvement in Sandy's ratemaking 
outside its boundaries, the customers would have no means to prevent 
Sandy from charging excessive rates. In its initial brief, Sandy 
states that the customers are not "entirely" disenfranchised, since 
they can attend Sandy City public meetings. (Sandy, Initial Brief, at 
9). 
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We deem the assertion less than ingenuous. One cannot be 
partially disenfranchised; either one can vote or not. Clearly the 
customers located outside Sandy's boundaries do not have a right to 
vote in Sandy City. The opportunity to attend meetings is a poor 
substitute for the right to reward or punish via the ballot. 
The fact that Sandy proposes to charge a differential rate 
immediately upon approval of the transaction is a strong indication 
of how the "outside" customers would fare under the proposal. 
Indeed, we can predict with considerable confidence, that in case of 
conflict between the interests of franchised and disenfranchised 
customers, the interests of the former will receive priority—no 
matter how vociferous the protests raised in meetings. 
Limitation of Sandy's Statutory Powers 
Unquestionably, as Sandy asserts, the Commission is a creature 
of statute with all the limitations on power and jurisdiction that 
implies. However, Sandy itself stands in much the same position; its 
powers are circumscribed also. See State v. Hutchinson, 624 P. 2d 
1116, 1121 (Utah 1980).1 
We proceed first on the premise that if Sandy takes over the 
utility service of White City Water Company, the city must also take 
on the utility's obligations. According to our Supreme Court in 
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co, 223 P.2d 577 
^he Hutchinson Court actually broadened a municipality's 
authority by holding that the powers delegated by the Legislature 
should be liberally construed. The Court's rationale was that local 
democratic institutions should be strengthened, thus empowering 
citizens in regard to the local affairs most immediately affecting 
them. Were we to adopt the Applicant's position, we would, of 
course, actually disempower the extra-territorial customers, running 
counter to the Hutchinson rationale. 
n9/IC 
DOCKET NO. 91-018-02 
- 6 -
(Utah 1950) , when North Salt Lake condemned a water company, it took 
upon itself the obligations imposed upon the water company, including 
the effect of an Order issued by this Commission before the 
condemnation.2 
Other jurisdictions have extended the principle explicitly to 
include rate regulation. For example, in City of Orangeburg v. Moss, 
204 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 1974), the court held that the South Carolina 
PSC had jurisdiction to regulate a municipality operating electrical 
facilities outside its boundaries. The court held that the 
constitutional grant of Power to municipalities by the State to 
operate electrical facilities was not a limitation on the power of 
the State to regulate those activities through the PSC or otherwise. 
It is the position of the plaintiff in the current action 
that this constitutional grant of power to the 
municipalities of the State to operate electrical 
facilities is a limitation on the power of the State of 
South Carolina to regulate those activities through the 
Public Service Commission or otherwise. The writer does 
not agree. He feels that the section in guestion was no 
more than a constitutional provision to permit certain 
municipal activities previously held ultra vires and that 
2At the time of that hearing the water company was a 
utility subject to the rules and regulations of the 
Public Service Commission and its findings and orders 
were binding on the company, its successors, those 
claiming through or under it, and those later dealing 
with it. 
• * * 
If limitations were imposed on the water company in the 
hearing before the Public Service Commission, then 
condemnation of the property by the town would not unblock 
the controls. The . . . town takes the franchise and 
property subject to all burdens of furnishing water that 
were imposed at the time of transfer. 
Id. at 223 P.2d 577. If a previous Commission Order is binding on a 
town clearly exercising a municipal function, a fortiori the town is 
subject to Commission regulation when exercising a non-municipal 
function. 
n«3 
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it is not to be construed as limiting the powers of the 
State to regulate such activities, (emphasis added.) 
Id. at 378. It is true that South Carolina had in place legislation 
specifically empowering their PSC to regulate extra-territorial 
service. The issue, nevertheless, was the constitutionality of that 
legislation, and we believe there is scant difference in principle 
between that case and this. 
It is not unreasonable to suppose that one of the obligations 
Sandy may be required to assume is that of state regulation of rates 
charged to customers residing outside the city limits. 
As derogating from the foregoing analysis, we have been cited 
Article XI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution which provides a 
municipality the authority to furnish public utility services "local 
in extent and use"; Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-914 (3) ; the Municipal 
Building Authority Act; the 1988 amended definition of "person" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 4-2-2; and Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 which gives a 
municipality authority to condemn a water system. We do not 
perceive any of these provisions as denying us authority to regulate 
rates charged by Sandy for water service outside its boundaries. 
Article XI, Section 5, gives Sandy the power to furnish public 
utility services, but not necessarily the power to set extra-
territorial rates, particularly in light of the "local in extent and 
use" provision, which has no obvious meaning other than as a 
reference to the City's boundaries. 
Any prohibition by the Municipal Building Authority Act is 
irrelevant in this proceeding. As noted in the Findings of Fact 
above, the sole role of the Authority is to be a conduit. 
Obviously, Sandy could issue and service its own bonds. We strongly 
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suspect the Authority is involved in the transaction only in a "belt 
and suspenders11 attempt to insulate the real principals, Applicant 
and Sandy, from our jurisdiction. We believe we are entitled to 
assess the substance, not the mere form, of the transaction. So 
assessing the transaction, it is obvious the Authority has no real 
role or participation in the arrangement, and its presence should be 
disregarded. 
It is true that in 1988 the Legislature deleted "governmental 
entity" from the definition of "person." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2 
(1988). Our perusal of the Legislative history of this change, 
however, does not indicate that the Legislature intended to foreclose 
our regulation of a cityfs extra-territorial retail water customers. 
(See transcript of the Legislative history on this amendment, 
Exhibit ,fA" to Reply Brief, White City Water Users). 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 does give a municipality power 
to condemn a water system, but it does not necessarily give a 
municipality power to set utility rates for extra-territorial retail 
customers. In a condemnation proceeding, a city is limited by strict 
laws to protect the new owners of those systems and the citizens 
served thereby. Indeed, as noted earlier, the St. Joseph Water case, 
supra, suggests that water systems acquired by condemnation carry 
with them all their regulatory baggage. 
Sandy does not have specific delegated authority to serve water 
outside its boundaries without state regulation. Where there are 
gaps in the coverage of applicable statutes, as in the instant case, 
we believe that legislative intent should be interpreted so as to 
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protect constitutional rights of citizens, which in this case are the 
extra-territorial retail customers. 
The Nature of the Arrangement 
As noted above, Sandy has made great efforts to avoid our 
jurisdiction in the way it has set up the proposed transfer. The 
elaborate nature of the arrangement between White City, the 
Authority, and Sandy, renders the arrangement suspect. 
Sandy's initial brief claims that neither White City, the 
Authority, nor Sandy are subject to our regulation. (Sandy, Initial 
Brief, at 6-14). As noted above, the role of the Authority is 
explicable only as an attempt to avoid our jurisdiction. Given the 
expressed intent to charge extra-territorial customers differential 
rates, Sandy's good faith, in structuring the transaction as it has, 
must be questioned. 
Sandv is Not Performing a Municipal Function 
Should Sandy provide water service to White City's extra-
territorial customers, it would, to that extent, not be exercising a 
municipal function. Sandy would be acting as a traditional utility 
(exercising a business function) and therefore would be subject to 
regulation. 
Sandy claims that Utah Constitution Art. VI, Section 28, 
prohibits us from interfering with Sandy's municipal functions. 
(Sandy, Initial Brief, at 7). Obviously, we agree that we cannot 
interfere with Sandy's municipal functions, but we maintain that 
Sandy's proposed service to the extra-territorial customers is not a 
municipal function. 
r\ o .1 Ci 
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Recent Utah cases support our position. In Utah Associated 
Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, 789 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1990), in which Art. VI, Section 28, was at issue, the Court 
discussed the alleged "municipal function" performed by Utah 
Associated Municipal Power Systems ("UAMPS") in attempting to 
construct a utility line and to provide utility service. UAMPS 
resisted the jurisdiction of the Commission on constitutional 
grounds, arguing that they were political subdivisions exercising 
municipal functions, even though part of their service area was 
located outside, or would have a substantial impact outside, the 
boundaries of the political subdivisions. 
The UAMPS Court applied a balancing test first enunciated in 
City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board. 767 P.2d, 530 
(Utah 1988). Under that test, no particular activity conducted by a 
municipality is ipso facto a municipal function for purposes of Art. 
VI, Section 28. Instead, a functional analysis is to be conducted, 
considering such factors as 
the relative abilities of the state and municipal 
governments to perform the function, the degree to which 
the performance of the function affects the interests of 
those beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and the 
extent to which the legislation under attack will intrude 
upon the ability of the people within the municipality to 
control through their elected officials the substantive 
policies that affect them uniquely.3 
3Id. at 534. The Court went on to say the balancing test would 
best serve the Constitutional purpose without "erecting mechanical 
conceptual categories that, without serving any substantial interest, 
may hobble the effective government which the state constitution as 
a whole was designed to permit." Ibid. In the instant case, of 
course, the only "substantial interest" our assuming jurisdiction 
would affect would be that of Sandy in "milking" the extra-
territorial customers to the maximum extent possible. 
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Applying that test, the UAMPS Court had little difficulty in finding 
that the construction of the utility transmission line for the 
purpose of generating, buying and selling electricity across the 
state was outside the ambit of Art. VI, Section 28. Utah Associated 
Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, supra, 789 P. 
2d at 302. 
The present proposal is closely analogous to the UAMPS case. 
In particular, those residing outside Sandy stand to be severely 
impacted, while our assuming jurisdiction in regard to them would 
have minimal impact on Sandy's legitimate interests. By purposefully 
acquiring an existing public utility, and thereby taking over the 
obligation to serve 58% of the customers of an existing certificated 
public utility, Sandy is stepping outside the exercise of its 
municipal function and subjecting itself to state regulation of rates 
for those extra-territorial customers surplus. 
Sandy attempts to bolster its position by referring to Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-14(1) concerning sale of surplus water by a 
municipality. A careful reading of this statute, however, weighs 
against Sandy's proposal and in favor of the extra-territorial 
customers. 
According to the statute, a city "may sell and deliver the 
surplus product or service capacity of any such works, not required 
by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the 
city. . . . " In attempting to show that it would be serving 
"surplus" water in accordance with this statute, Sandy states that it 
"has more than ample capacity to serve the non-Sandy White City 
customers and will therefore in fact be selling 'surplus' water to 
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them upon acquisition of the White City system." (Sandy, Initial 
Brief, at 8) . This interpretation is contrary to Utah case law on 
the subject and contrary to a common sense definition of "surplus." 
In support of Sandy's interpretation of surplus, it cites 
County Water System v. Salt Lake Citv, 278 P 2d 285 (Utah 1954) and 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P 2d 119 (Utah 1977) 
In County Water System, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that the authority of municipalities to sell utility services beyond 
its corporate boundaries was limited to the disposal of surplus 
water. Id. at 289. 
In fact, after first delineating a municipality's powers of 
surplus water disposal in sweeping terms, Justice Crockett, writing 
for the Court, appears to have had immediate second thoughts. In his 
next paragraph, he hedged the municipality's authority: 
But such permissive sale of surplus water . . . is clearly 
not calculated to permit the city to purchase water solely 
for resale, nor to construct, own or manage facilities and 
equipment for the distribution of water outside of its 
city limits as a general business. 
Id. at 290. 
The Court also made clear its concept of surplus water—a 
temporary glut occasioned by provision for prudent future expansion. 
This would, according to the court, foreclose a municipality's 
commitment to purchasers of surplus water for any long-term supply. 
Ibid. Under this concept, if Sandy is indeed to sell surplus water, 
the extra-territorial customers stand to be left literally high and 
dry in the near to medium term. 
In this case, however, Sandy will not be disposing of surplus 
water it now possesses—it will be surplus only by virtue of Sandy's 
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calculated acquisition of a class of captive, disenfranchised 
customers—precisely the situation Justice Crockett inveighed 
against. 
Sandy cites Salt Lake County, supra, for the proposition that 
"[A municipality's] business in furnishing water to its residents and 
activities reasonably incidental thereto is not subject to 
regulation by the Public Service Commission." Id. at 570 P.2d 121-
122. Sandy, however, fails to quote the complete paragraph. The 
next, and more relevant sentence is: "But just however great an 
extent a city may engage in rendering a utility service outside its 
city limits without being subject to some public regulation is not so 
clearly determined." (emphasis added.) The second sentence is not 
mere dictum. The case involved the propriety of a summary judgment 
rendered by the district court, and the Supreme Court remanded for 
determination of precisely the issue of a municipality's amenability 
to regulation of extra-territorial service. We do not know the 
subsequent course of the litigation. 
The Salt Lake County case evidences to us the Court's concern 
with precisely the potential for abuse presented by the instant 
proposal. We think it would be difficult to find a clearer instance 
of a city's stepping over the boundary of legitimate surplus water 
sales under the statute. 
Our conclusion is strengthened by C.P. National Corporation v. 
Public Service Commission, 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981), According to 
the Court, 
" . . . We believe that [Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14] imposes 
a limitation on a city operating outside its borders. It 
negates the proposition that a city could purposely engage 
in the distribution of power to localities or persons 
0353 
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outside its limits except to dispose of surplus." [Citing 
County Water System, supra]. In the instant case, the 
municipalities intend to continue to serve a large area 
outside any of their limits. . . . 
Section 10-8-14 does not contemplate nor authorize a city 
to so operate its electric light and power works. There 
is good justification for this limitation since 
municipally owned utilities are not subject to the 
jurisdiction and supervision of the Public Service 
Commission but are controlled solely by the 
administration of the city or town wherein they are 
located . . . customers who are non-residents of the 
municipalities would be left at the mercy of officials 
over whom they have no control at the ballot box and they 
could not turn to the Public Service Commission for 
relief. (emphasis added.) (citations omitted.) 
Id. at 524. 
We can only add that the situation is not one whit different 
when a municipality purposefully acquires an existing, regulated 
water system. While there may be no explicit statutory authority for 
us to assume jurisdiction, the obvious remedy for the abuse of extra-
territorial customers is for us to continue to regulate their rates; 
otherwise, to meet the Court's concern, the instant proposal would 
have to be found ultra vires.4 
If there is a common thread running through the history of 
economic regulation in the United States, it is the abhorrence of 
unchecked monopoly. We see no reason to suppose that a monopoly held 
by a municipality over powerless extra-territorial utility customers 
would be any more benevolent than a monopoly held privately. Sandy's 
expressed intent to impose higher rates immediately upon the extra-
4That is the course the Court took in the CP National case. The 
main issue was the constitutionality of the municipalities1 acquiring 
an existing electrical utility by condemnation. The Court assumed 
without discussion that we would have no jurisdiction over rates 
charged the extra-territorial customers. One wonders if the same 
result would have been reached had the Court considered the 
jurisdictional issue and applied the City of West Jordan test. 
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territorial customers is ample demonstration of the reason we are 
unwilling to cede jurisdiction in these circumstances. 
We conclude that in the event the proposal presented by 
Applicant were to be approved by the Commission, the Commission would 
retain jurisdiction to regulate rates charged the extra-territorial 
retail customers, at least to the extent of nullifying invidious 
discrimination. Accordingly, Applicant's prayer for a declaratory 
judgment to the contrary should be denied. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
» On the Commission's own motion, the prayer of WHITE CITY WATER 
COMPANY, for a declaration that, should the Commission approve 
a transfer of the stock of said company to the Sandy City 
Building Board, pursuant to the contract delineated in said 
Company's application, the Commission would have no 
jurisdiction thereafter to set rates for customers residing 
outside the boundaries of Sandy City, be, and the same hereby 
is, severed from the balance of the proceeding and given the 
Docket Number 91-018-02; 
» Said prayer is denied; 
» Any party aggrieved by this Order may, within 3 0 days of the 
issuance hereof, petition for review; failure so to do will 
forfeit the right to such review, as well as the right to 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
0355 
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DATED a t S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah, t h i s 20 th day of February, 
1992 . 
BrianTT 
2ZSZZ 
i t eykr t , (Chairman 
„-M/£*yl~^ 
ATTEST: 
StepheA C. Hewlett, Commissioner 
Pro Tempore 
^L 
Jultiie Orchard 
Commission S e c r e t a r y 
Tab 6 
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION 
OF WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY FOR 
COMMISSION APPROVAL OF A CONTRACT 
ENTERED INTO ON THE 8TH DAY OF 
OCTOBER, 1991, UNDER WHICH 
CONTRACT SANDY CITY AND THE 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY OF 
SANDY CITY, UTAH, WILL PURCHASE 
ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING STOCK OF 
WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY 
White City Water Company hereby petitions and 
represents to the Commission as follows: 
1. White City V7at^r Company is a corporation 
organized under and pursuant to the laws of the State of 
Utah and having its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, 
2. Sandy City is a municipal corporation organized 
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State 
of Utah and is located within the boundaries of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
3. The Municipal Building Authority of Sandy 
City, Utah, is established and created pursuant to Title 17A, 
Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
4. On the 8th day of October, 1991, Sandy City 
and the Muncipal Building Authority of Sandy City entered 
APPLICATION 
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into a contract with White City Water Company whereby Sandy 
City, through its municipal building authority, will acquire 
the stock of White City Water Company, pursuant to certain 
terms and conditions set forth in the contract, a copy of 
which contract is marked Exhibit A and attached hereto. 
5. White City Water Company holds Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity No. 1121 issued by the Public 
Service Commission of Utah on the 11th day of May, 1955, 
authorizing the Company to: 
(a) Construct, maintain and operate a water system 
consisting of a water well located in Section 8, 
Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian 
in Salt Lake County, Utah having a capacity of 
approximately 1,200 gallons of water per minute 
with a pipe line leading from said well to a 500,000 
gallon reservoir located in Section 9, Township 3 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian 
with a pipe line leading from said storage tank 
to the area to be served with the necessary distribution 
lines, service lines and other facilities to serve 
water for domestic, culinary and other purposes 
within the area bounded on the West by the East 
line of 7th East Street, on the East by 20th East 
Street, on the North by 94th South Street and 
on the South by 120th South Street in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
(b) To construct, maintain and operate such additional 
wells, pipe lines and extended water system facilities 
as may be necessary from time to time to adequately 
serve water for domestic, culinary and other purposes 
within the area above specified. 
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6. The above described geographical area is 
contiguous and lies partly within Sandy City and partly 
within the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County. White 
City Water Company has approximately 3650 customers plus 
83 lines to residential lots, not yet connected. 42% of 
the connections are within the city limits of Sandy City 
and 58% are in contiguous Salt Lake County. 
7. Sandy City has constructed and maintained 
a municipal culinary water system rendering service to approxi-
mately 21,050 residential, commercial, and industrial customers 
within the limits of Sandy City. The Sandy City water system 
is an efficient and well-maintained system having facilities 
to deliver water to its customers. The water system at present 
has facilities which are fully sufficient to provide storage 
and pressure to its existing customers as well as to the customers 
of White City Water Company if this contract is approved. 
8. White City Water Company has a distributing 
system sufficient to serve its current customers. White 
City Water Company also has water rights which during 
ordinary years are fully sufficient to give adequate and 
continuous water service to its customers. However, White 
City Water Company lacks adequate facilities for the 
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storage of water at a sufficient elevation to provide sufficient 
pressure to adequately serve its customers and/ in case 
of an emergency draw down, a lack of sufficient storage 
capacity to meet a prolonged emergency. In order to adjust 
for this situation, White City Water Company has arrangements 
whereby it will sell certain water at its wellheads to the 
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and purchase 
back at a very much higher price from the Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District water delivered at a sufficient 
elevation and in sufficient quantities to provide both pressure 
and adequate flow in emergency situations. This arrangement 
is an expensive one for White City Water Company as it receives 
for its water at the wellhead under this contract $20.00 
per acre foot while it pays for the water delivered at the 
higher elevations the sum of $125.22 per acre foot. This 
contract with the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
is subject to cancellation by the parties. Furthermore, 
the price to be charged for the water that is delivered 
is almost exclusively at the discretion of the Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District. Thus White City Water 
Company is under constant threat of either discontinuance 
of this service or the pricing of the service at a level 
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which is unacceptable to White City Water Company and its 
customers who would bear the ultimate responsibility of 
paying for these services through higher rates, 
9. White City Water Company has attempted to 
get permission to construct additional storage facilities 
on property which it owns in Sandy City and which is of 
sufficient elevation to provide adequate pressure. Sandy 
City, however, has been unwilling to grant a variance from 
zoning ordinances to permit the construction of such storage 
facilities and this Commission has declined to use its authority/ 
if such authority it has, to compel Sandy City to grant 
such variance. White City Water Company has explored other 
sites outside Sandy City as a possible location for constructing 
new storage facilities; however, all such available sites 
are expensive to purchase, remote from the White City Water 
Company's distribution system and its wells and would entail 
the expenditure of money beyond the present resources of 
White City Water Company. If it were possible to borrow 
funds for such construction, it would require substantially 
higher rates from the customers of White City Water Company 
in order to service the debt and amortize the investment 
of such additional storage facilities. 
-5-
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10. Sandy City already has in existence or under 
construction sufficient storage facilities to provide adequate 
volume and pressure for White City Water Ccmpany customers 
if operation of the two systems were integrated. 
11. While White City Water Company customers 
now pay generally lower rates than Sandy City charges to 
its customers for similar service, this situation will not 
prevail for long if White City must continue to render the 
service to its customers on its own. The cost of maintaining 
an aging system and the cost of required new facilities 
as above described will in the near future require White 
City Water Company to raise its rates substantially for 
it to continue as a viable corporation. 
12. The water systems cf White City Water Company 
and Sandy City are well matched for integration. The approval 
of this application is in the public interest and will result 
in better service to all customers of White City Water Company 
and Sandy City in the foreseeable future. 
13. As part of the terms of the agreement, the 
White City Water Company wll remain intact as a corporation 
over the life of the bonds which the municipal building 
authority of Sandy City proposes to issue to raise capital 
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for the acquisition of the stock of White City Water Company. 
Sandy City, however, will operate the two systems on an 
integrated basis and requests an order from this Commission 
to the effect that such an integrated system will be considered 
a municipal system in its entirety under the laws of the 
State of Utah and thus be exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 174A-13-914(3) from the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Commission of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, applicant prays that this matter be 
set down for hearing and that upon such hearing the Commission 
approve the contract described above and find that the integrated 
system constitutes a municipal water system under the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
DATED this 31st day of, 
Calvin L. Rampton 
Attorney for White City "Water Company 
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:AftRS 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH, 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE. ) 
John E. Papanikolas, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says that I am the President of White City Water 
Company, that I have read the foregoing Application and 
that the same is true and complete to the best of my knowledge 
and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -*&/ day 
of October, 1991. 
My Commission Expires: 
:y 
Notary Public ^STf. ^i^A^/>^- _^_ 
Residing at £&L^ Jttj&LS&ttre&S <f^ 
TT 
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Tab 7 
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 
AGREEMENT FOR 
THE PURCHASE OP ALL OP THE STOCK 
OF WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY 
This Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into this 
8th day of October, 1991, by Sandy City, Utah (the "City"), the 
Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City, Utah (the "Author-
ity") and all of the shareholders (the "Shareholders") of White 
City Water Company, Inc., a Utah corporation (the "Company"), for 
the purchase of all of the outstanding shares in the Company by 
the Authority, as more fully described herein. 
RECITALS 
A. The City has created the Authority pursuant to 
Title 17A, Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended (the "Act"). 
B. The Authority is authorized by the provisions of 
the Act to purchase shares of the outstanding stock of the Com-
pany and to enter into this Agreement and the other agreements 
pertaining to this transaction which are to be executed and 
delivered by the Authority. 
C. The Authority desires to purchase 100% of the out-
standing stock of the Company, subject to the terms and condi-
tions stated herein. 
D. The Shareholders are the owners of 100% of the 
outstanding stock of the Company and each of the Shareholders 
desires to sell his or her shares of the stock of the Company on 
the terms and conditions stated herein; however, as a condition 
to the sale, the Shareholders desire that the Authority or the 
City be not permitted to merge, consolidate or liquidate the Com-
pany in order to maintain the corporate identity and integrity of 
the Company in case of a default under this Agreement requiring 
the Shareholders to repossess the Shares. 
E. The Authority is authorized by the Act to issue 
revenue bonds thereunder to finance the acquisition of all or 
part of the stock of the Company. 
F. Pursuant to the Act, the Authority is authorized 
to purchase the shares of the Company and cause the assets of the 
Company to be leased, and the beneficial ownership rights in the 
Company to be assigned, to the City for annual rentals which are 
sufficient to pay the annual debt service payments to be paid by 
the Authority on bonds issued by it to finance the cost of 
acquiring all or part of the shares of the Company; provided, 
however, that the City's obligations to make annual rental and 
royalty payments each year are subject to annual budget and 
appropriation for such purpose by the City Council and shall be 
terminated in the event of nonappropriation. 
G. Pursuant to the Act, the City desires to lease 
from the Authority the water system (the "System") now owned by 
the Company, and to receive an assignment of the beneficial own-
ership rights in the Company, following the acquisition by the 
Authority of the Company stock from the Shareholders. 
H. Bonds issued by the Authority may be secured by a 
pledge of the rentals/royalties payable to the Authority by the 
City from the lease of the System, and assignment of beneficial 
ownership rights in the Company, by a mortgage on and security 
interest in the System, a pledge of the stock of Company and by 
other security devices. 
I. The Shareholders are willing to accept revenue 
bonds issued by the Authority, secured as provided herein, in 
partial payment for their shares of the Company's stock, in order 
to receive tax exempt interest payable on the bonds and to have 
the sale of shares treated as an installment sale under federal 
income tax laws. 
Now, therefore, in consideration of the mutual agree-
ments, covenants and undertakings of the parties set forth 
herein, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
ARTICLE I. DEFINITIONS 
The terms defined in this Article I shall have the 
meanings provided herein, unless the context clearly requires 
otherwise. Except where the context clearly requires otherwise, 
words of the masculine gender shall be construed to include cor-
relative words of the feminine and neuter genders and vice versa 
and words of the singular number shall be construed to include 
correlative words of the plural number and vice versa. The terms 
"hereby," "hereof," "hereto," "herein," "hereunder," and any sim-
ilar terms as used in this Agreement, refer to this Agreement. 
All references herein to sections, subsections, paragraphs or 
clauses are, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, to 
the corresponding sections, subsections, paragraphs or clauses of 
this Agreement. 
"Act" means the Utah Municipal Building Authority Act, 
Title 17A, Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
"Aggregate Downpayment" means the aggregate amount to 
be paid by the Authority on the Aggregate Purchase Price at Clos-
ing, as provided in Section 2.5(a)(1). 
"Aggregate Purchase Price" means the aggregate purchase 
price for the Shares stated in Section 2.2, as it may be adjusted 
as provided in Section 2.4. 
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"Agreement" means this Agreement, including the Exhib-
its hereto. 
"Annual Payment Date" means the first day of the month 
next succeeding the first anniversary of the Closing and thereaf-
ter on each anniversary of such first day until the Bonds and all 
interest thereon shall have been paid in full. 
"Audited Financial Statements" means the audited finan-
cial statements of the Company dated as of December 31, 1990, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit Af and the Closing 
Date Audited Financial Statements. 
"Authority" means the Municipal Building Authority of 
Sandy City, Utah. 
"Bond Counsel" means Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, as bond counsel for the Bonds. 
"Bondholder" or "Bondholders" means the holders of the 
Bonds outstanding. 
"Bondholder's Percentage Share" means, for each Bond-
holder, the principal amount of the Bonds held by the Bondholder, 
divided by the aggregate principal amount of the Bonds, multi-
plied by one hundred. 
"Bonds" means the revenue bonds of the Authority, dated 
on the date of Closing, to be issued pursuant to the Act to 
finance part of the Aggregate Purchase Price and delivered at 
Closing to the Shareholders who elect not to be paid in full for 
their Individual Shares at Closing. 
"City" means Sandy City, Utah. 
"City Council" means the City Council of the City. 
"Closing" means the date on which the transaction con-
templated by this Agreement and the Related Documents will be 
closed, as specified in Section 2.6. 
"Closing Date Audited Financial Statements" means the 
audited financial statements of the Company, which have been pre-
pared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
and practices consistently applied, current as of the date of 
Closing, to be delivered to the Authority as provided in Section 
5.1(a) hereof. 
"Company" means White City Water Company, Inc., a Utah 
corporat ion. 
"Deed of Trust and Security Agreement" means the Deed 
of Trust, Assignment of Rents and Security Agreement dated as of 
the date of Closing, as may be extended by agreement of the 
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parties hereto in writing, between the Authority and the Trustee 
granting a first lien and security interest on and in the System 
and the Revenues and other collateral securing the Bonds. 
"Employees" means the employees of the Company listed 
on Exhibit B hereto. 
"Franchise Order" means the Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity No. 1121 of the PSC dated May 11, 1955, in the Mat-
ter of the Amended Application of White City Water Company, Inc. 
for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, Case No. 4140, 
granting to the Company the rights in the Service Area as stated 
therein. 
"Governmental Authority" means the United States of 
America, any state or political subdivision thereof and any 
entity exercising executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory or 
administrative functions of or pertaining to government. 
"Indenture" means the Indenture of Trust dated as of 
the date of Closing, as may be extended by the parties hereto in 
writing, between the Authority and the Trustee, pursuant to which 
the Bonds will be issued. 
"Individual Shares" means the number of shares of the 
common stock of the Company owned by each of the Shareholders as 
shown on Exhibit C attached hereto. 
"Individual Shares Downpayment" means the amount of the 
Individual Shares Purchase Price which is to be paid to each of 
the Shareholders by the Authority at Closing. 
"Individual Shares Purchase Price" means the portion of 
the Aggregate Purchase Price to be paid to each of the Sharehold-
ers for the Purchase of his or her Individual Shares, as provided 
in Section 2.3. 
"Lease and Assignment" means the Lease and Assignment 
Agreement dated as of the date of Closing, as may be extended by 
the parties hereto in writing, between the Authority, as 
lessor/assignor, and the City, as lessee/assignee, pursuant to 
which the City will lease the System from the Authority, and by 
which the Authority will assign the beneficial ownership rights 
in the Company to the City. 
"Lease Payments" means the annual payments to be made 
by the City to the Authority under the Lease and Assignment. 
"Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, 
business trust, joint stock company, trust, unincorporated asso-
ciation, joint venture, Governmental Authority or other entity of 
whatever nature. 
"PSC" means the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
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"PSC Order" means the order of the PSC referred to in 
Sect ion 7.1. 
"Related Documents" means the Indenture, the Lease and 
Assignment, the Financing Statement, the Stock Pledge Agreement, 
the Deed of Trust and Security Agreement and such other documents 
as may be defined as Related Documents in the Indenture. 
"Revenues" means all moneys pledged under the Indenture 
and paid or payable to the Trustee for the account of the Author-
ity in accordance with the Lease and Assignment, including, with-
out limitation, the Lease Payments. 
"Security" means: (a) a first pledge of and security 
interest in the Revenues, (b) a first lien on and security inter-
est in the System, and (c) a first pledge of and lien on the 
Shares. 
"Semiannual Interest Payment Date" means the first day 
of the next succeeding six months from the Closing and thereafter 
on each anniversary of this date. 
"Service Area" means the area located in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, whose boundaries are: north boundary - the south 
side of 9400 South Street; east boundary - the west side of 2000 
East Street; south boundary - the north side of 12000 South 
Street; west boundary - the east side of 700 East Street, in 
which the Company is currently authorized to provide water util-
ity service pursuant to the Franchise Order. The Company is cur-
rently offering or providing service in the area shown on the map 
attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
"Shareholders" means all of the owners of the capital 
stock of the Company. 
"Shareholders' Agent" means John E. Papanikolas, as 
agent for the Shareholders for the purpose of giving certain 
notifications to the Authority, as provided herein. 
"Shareholder's Proportionate Share" means any increase 
or decrease in the Aggregate Purchase Price pursuant to Section 
2.4, divided by the number of Shares and multiplied by the number 
of each Shareholder's Individual Shares. 
"Shares" means one hundred Percent (100%) of the Indi-
vidual Shares, being one hundred percent (100%) of the outstand-
ing capital stock of the Company. 
"State" means the State of Utah. 
"Stated Interest Rate for the Bonds" means seven and 
four-tenths percent (7.4%) per annum, calculated on the basis of 
a 360-day year of twelve 30-day months, the interest rate payable 
on the Bonds. 
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"Stock Pledge Agreement" means the Stock Pledge Agree-
ment dated as of the date of Closing, as may be extended by the 
parties hereto, in writing, between the Authority, the Sharehold-
ers and the Trustee granting a first lien and security interest 
on and in the Shares of the Company. 
"System" means the culinary water system of the Com-
pany, including all water rights and facilities pertaining 
thereto, as more particularly described on Exhibit E attached 
hereto. 
"Trustee" means West One Trust Company, a Utah corpora-
tion, as trustee under the Indenture. 
ARTICLE II. SALE AND PURCHASE OF THE SHARES 
Section 2.1 Purchase and Sale. The Authority agrees 
to buy from each of the Shareholders and each of the Shareholders 
agrees to sell to the Authority, his or her Individual Shares. 
Section 2.2 Aggregate Purchase Price. The Authority 
will pay the aggregate amount of Five Million Seven Hundred Thou-
sand Dollars ($5,700,000.00) for the Shares, subject to adjust-
ment as providea in Section 2.4 hereof, together with interest on 
the Bonds, as provided in Section 2.5. 
Section 2.3 Individual Shares Purchase Price. Each of 
the Shareholders shall be paid for his or her Individual Shares a 
principal amount equal to the Aggregate Purchase Price multiplied 
by the number of each Shareholder's Individual Shares and divided 
by the number of Shares, together with applicable interest, as 
provided in Section 2.5. 
Section 2.4 Adiustment to Aggregate Purchase Price. 
The principal amount of the Aggregate Purchase Price will be 
adjusted upward or downward in an amount equal to any change in 
the retained earnings of the Company from the amount thereof 
stated OP the Audited Financial Statements and in the amount 
thereof stated in the Closing Date Audited Financial Statements. 
Furthermore, the retained earnings number from the Closing Date 
Audited Financial Statements, used for the calculation described 
in this paragraph, shall be adjusted by adding back the amount of 
depreciation expenses accrued by the Company through June 30, 
1991, which shall not be reduced by the negative amortization of 
connection fees and "aid to construction assets" {as defined in 
the Audited Financial Statements). Any adjustments to the prin-
cipal amount of the Aggregate Purchase Price under this Section 
2.4 will be determined within thirty (30) days subsequent to the 
receipt of the Closing Date Audited Financial Statements. The 
Authority and the Trustee shall be directed in the Indenture to 
take the actions described below upon the determination of this 
Section 2.4 adjustment: 
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Calculate for each of the Shareholders the amount 
of his or her Shareholder's Proportionate Share 
applicable to this Section 2.4 adjustment. If the 
adjustment results in an increase in the Aggregate 
Purchase Price, the Authority shall pay to the 
Trustee for each of the Shareholders an amount, in 
cash, equal to his or her Shareholder's Propor-
tionate Share applicable to this Section 2.4 
adjustment. If the adjustment results in a 
decrease in the Aggregate Purchase Price each of 
the Shareholders shall pay to the Authority, in 
cash, the amount of his or her Shareholder's Pro-
portionate Share applicable to this Section 2.4 
adjustment. 
Section 2.5 Payment of the Aggregate Purchase Price. 
(a) The Aggregate Purchase Price and applicable 
interest thereon shall be paid as follows: 
(1) The Aggregate Downpayment shall be paid 
in cash, at Closing, in the amount specified to 
the Authority, in writing, by the Shareholders' 
Agent, not less than fifteen (15) days before the 
Closing, which amount shall not exceed One Million 
Dollars ($1,000,000.00), which amount is presently 
estimated to be $884,100. The Individual Shares 
Downpayment for each of the Shareholders shall be 
paid by the Authority to each of the Shareholders 
at Closing. 
(2) The balance of the Aggregate Purchase 
Price shall be evidenced by the Bonds, to be 
issued and delivered by the Authority to the 
Shareholders at Closing pursuant to the Act. The 
principal of the Bonds shall be payable on each 
Annual Payment Date, in fifteen (15) annual prin-
cipal installments which, together with the inter-
est payable thereon as provided below in this Sec-
tion 2.5, will produce annual debt service pay-
ments which are as nearly equal as practicable 
(except for the last principal installment). 
(3) Interest on the Bonds will commence to 
accrue on the date of Closing and shall be paid on 
each Semiannual Interest Payment Date and on each 
Annual Payment Date, until the Aggregate Purchase 
Price shall have been paid in full. 
(b) Interest on the Bonds shall be payable at the 
Stated Interest Rate for the Bonds. 
(c) The last principal installment of the Bonds 
shall be in an amount sufficient to pay in full all 
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outstanding principal, late payment charges, if any, 
and any other amounts owed under this Agreement or the 
Related Documents with respect to the purchase of the 
Shares. 
(d) Overdue principal and (to the extent permit-
ted by applicable law) interest on the Bonds shall bear 
interest from the due date at a per annum interest rate 
equal to the Stated Interest Rate for the Bonds plus 
four percent (4%), until such overdue amount shall be 
paid in full; provided, however, that no representation 
is or shall be made regarding the tax exemption of 
interest to the extent of the above mentioned increase 
of four percent (4%) over the Stated Interest Rate for 
the Bonds for late payment. 
(e) It is anticipated that some of the Sharehold-
ers will receive from the Aggregate Downpayment at 
Closing, in cash, the entire principal amount of their 
Individual Shares Purchase Price, and that each of the 
other Shareholders will receive an amount at Closing 
equal to approximately ten percent (10%) of their Indi-
vidual Shares Purchase Price. The Shareholders' Agent 
will provide to the Authority, not less than fifteen 
(15) days before Closing, the names of the Shareholders 
whose Individual Shares Purchase Price is to be paid in 
full at Closing. Each of the other Shareholders will 
select the particular maturity or maturities of the 
Bonds to be received by him or her at Closing and give 
notice to the Shareholders' Agent not less than twenty 
(20) days before Closing, whereupon the Shareholders' 
Agent will advise the Authority, at least fifteen (15) 
days before Closing, of the maturity or maturities of 
the Bonds selected by each of these Shareholders. 
(f) In addition, each of the Shareholders who 
elect to receive some of the Bonds at Closing, will 
have the rignt to require the Authority, at the sole 
option of the electing Shareholder and subject to the 
existence on the prepayment date specified below, of a 
higher federal tax rate and the availability of funds 
in a reserve account for the Bonds, as described below, 
to prepay, in whole or in part, the principal amount of 
the Bonds held by the electing Shareholder at any time 
on or after the eleventh Annual Payment Date, at a 
repayment price equal to the principal amount being 
prepaid plus accrued interest to the date of prepay-
ment. As used herein, the phrase "higher federal tax 
rate" shall mean a federal income tax rate increase, 
of not less than seven percent (7%) of the federal 
income tax rate applicable at the end of the previous 
tax year applicable to the Shareholder exercising such 
option. The electing Shareholders will be able to exer-
cise this option only if: (i) it will allow them to be 
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taxed for federal income tax purposes at a lower rate 
than the higher federal tax rate; and (ii) the aggre-
gate amount of prepayments to be made to all electing 
Shareholders does not exceed the maximum amount which 
may be held as of the date of Closing in a reserve 
account for the holders of the Bonds at an unrestricted 
yield without impairing the exemption of interest on 
the Bonds from federal income taxation (such amount to 
be specified in the Related Documents) and does not 
violate any applicable law of the State; such prepay-
ment shall be made on a prorata basis to electing 
Shareholders if the funds in the reserve account are 
insufficient to prepay the entire principal amount of 
the Bonds held by electing Shareholders. 
Section 2.7 Clos i nq. The Closing for the purchase of 
the Shares and the issuance of the Bonds will be on December 30f 
1991, or fifteen (15) days after the date the PSC Order has 
become final and nonappealable, whichever is earlier, unless 
extended by the parties hereto in writing. 
ARTICLE III. THE BONDS; SECURITY FOR THE BONDS; BOND 
PAYMENTS; DOCUMENTATION 
Section 3.1 Issuance of Bonds; Collateral. The 
Authority shall issue the Bonds pursuant to the Act and shall 
enter into the Lease and Assignment with the City pursuant to the 
Act for the lease of the System and assignment of beneficial own-
ership rights in the Company to the City, subject to the payment 
of Lease Payments at least sufficient in amount to pay the prin-
cipal of and interest on the Bonds as they come due; provided, 
however, that the City's obligations to make annual Lease Pay-
ments under the Lease and Assignment each year are subject to 
annual budget and appropriation for such purpose by the City 
Council and shall be terminated in an event of nonappropriation 
under the Lease and Assignment. The obligation of the Authority 
to the Shareholders represented by the Bonds shall be secured by 
the Security. The Authority and the City shall deliver to the 
Shareholders at Closing an opinion of Bond Counsel that the Stock 
Pledge Agreement, Deed of Trust and Security Agreement and any 
other mortgages, deeds of trust, pledge agreements and security 
agreements creating these liens and security interests are the 
valid and legally binding obligations of, and are legally 
enforceable against, the Authority and the City. 
Section 3.2 Costs of Issuance of the Bonds. The 
Authority will pay all costs of issuance of the Bonds; provided 
that the fees and costs of counsel for the Shareholders will not 
be deemed to be costs of issuance of the Bonds for this purpose. 
Section 3.3 Payments of the Bonds. All payments 
required to be paid by the Authority on the Bonds shall be made 
to the Trustee for the benefit of the Bondholders. The Indenture 
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will prescribe the maturities for the Bonds, the i'nterest payment 
dates (as provided herein) and the manner in which the amounts 
received by the Trustee will be paid by the Trustee to the 
Bondholders. 
Section 3.4 Documentation. The Authority and the City 
agree to negotiate and enter into the Lease and Assignment, the 
Indenture, the Stock Pledge Agreement, Deed of Trust and Security 
Agreement and other Related Documents and agreements as are 
needed or appropriate to document and carry out the terms and 
conditions of this transaction, including, without limitation, 
all other agreements, certificates and documents reasonably 
required by Bond Counsel or the Shareholders in connection with 
the Closing. The terms and conditions of this Agreement, the 
Related Documents and all other transaction documents will comply 
with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended, relating to installment sale transactions, and applica-
ble regulations and rulings thereunder, as well as all other 
applicable laws, to allow the transaction to be treated as an 
installment sale by the Shareholders for income tax purposes; 
provided however, the Authority and City make no representation, 
warranty or guarantee as to whether the Shareholders may report 
the sale of the Shares on the installment method for federal 
income tax purposes. The Indenture shall provide that the 
Authority will pay all fees, expenses and other charges of the 
Trustee (including, without limitation, its fees, expenses and 
charges as Escrow Agent) under the Indenture. 
ARTICLE IV. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF THE 
PARTIES 
Section 4.1 Representations and Warranties of the 
Shareholders. Each of the Shareholders, for himself or herself, 
represents and warrants to the Authority and the City that, as of 
the date of Closing: 
(a) The Company is a corporation duly incorpo-
rated and validly existing and in good standing under 
the laws of the State. 
(b) The Shares constitute one hundred percent 
(100%) of the capital stock of the Company issued and 
outstanding on the date of this Agreement and on the 
date of Closing. 
(c) The number of the Shares indicated adjacent 
to his or her name on Exhibit C hereto are owned by him 
or her free and clear of any liens or encumbrances. 
(d) This Agreement, when executed and delivered 
by the Shareholder making this representation, and 
assuming due authorization, execution and delivery by 
the other parties hereto, will constitute a legal, 
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valid and binding obligation of such Shareholder 
enforceable against such Shareholder in accordance with 
its terms, subject to the qualification that enforce-
ability may be limited by applicable bankruptcy, insol-
vency, reorganization, moratorium or similar laws 
affecting the enforcement of creditors1 rights and by 
general principles of equity. 
(e) The Company has duly made and filed all tax 
returns and other reports required by law to be filed 
with the federal government and with all state and 
local governments to the laws of which it is subject. 
All Company income taxes for all years through December 
31, 1990, have been paid. 
(f) The Company has complied with all applicable 
federal and state laws relating to the employment of 
labor, including the provisions thereof relating to 
wages, collective bargaining, and the payment of Social 
Security taxes, and is not liable for any arrears of 
wages or any tax or penalties for failure to comply 
with any of the foregoing laws. There are no material 
controversies, pending or threatened, between the Com-
pany and its employees. 
(g) The Company has no claims, litigation, 
actions or suits or proceedings pending or threatened 
against it or its property in any court or before any 
governmental agency, other than the proceedings before 
the PSC referred to in Section 7.1 of this Agreement, 
and that threatened litigation referred to in a letter 
dated July 17, 1991 from Haley & Stoleberger, repre-
senting Paulina Flint and others, to the White City 
Water Company Board of Directors, a copy of which has 
been given to all parties hereto. 
(h) The Company has all right, title and interest 
represented by the Certificates of Water Appropriation 
listed on Exhibit F and the Applications for Water 
Appropriation listed on Exhibit G, subject to the 
rights of prior beneficial users, and such restrictions 
as may be imposed by state or federal law or noted of 
record in the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, 
the State Engineer, or the records of the Company, and 
the liens and security interests held by the Sharehold-
ers pursuant to this Agreement. 
(i) The Authority shall have sixty (60) days from 
the date of execution of this Agreement to inspect the 
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder, the State 
Engineer, and Company pertaining to the water rights 
and application for water rights to be conveyed as 
stated herein. 
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Section 4.2 Representations and Warranties of the 
Authority and the City. The Authority and the City, each for 
itself, represents and warrants to the Shareholders, as follows: 
(a) The Authority is a duly organized and validly 
existing building ownership authority of the City, cre-
ated pursuant to the Act and a resolution of the City 
Council of the City duly adopted on April 5, 1988. 
(b) The execution and delivery of this Agreement, 
the Bonds and each of the Related Documents and other 
agreements, instruments, certificates and documents to 
be executed and delivered by the Authority and/or the 
City in connection with this transaction have been (or 
will be prior to Closing) duly authorized by all neces-
sary action of the Authority or the City, as 
• appropriate. 
(c) This Agreement, the Bonds, the Related Docu-
ments and any other agreements or instruments to be 
executed by the Authority, when executed and delivered 
by the Authority, and assuming due authorization, exe-
cution and delivery thereof by the other parties 
thereto, will constitute legal, valid and binding obli-
gations of the Authority enforceable against the 
Authority in accordance with their terms, subject to 
the qualification that enforceability may be limited by 
applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, mor-
atorium or similar laws affecting the enforcement of 
creditors' rights and by general principles of equity. 
(d) No authorization or approval of, or other 
action by, and no notice to or filing with, any Govern-
mental Authority is required to be obtained or made by 
the Authority or the City, except for City Council and 
Authority resolutions authorizing the execution and 
delivery of the Lease and Assignment and the issuance 
of the Bonds, and the other transactions contemplated 
herein, for the due execution, delivery and performance 
by the Authority and the City of this Agreement, the 
Bonds and the Related Documents other than such as have 
been obtained and are in full force and effect, and 
except as specified in Section 7.1 of this Agreement. 
(e) No litigation, investigation or proceeding of 
or before any arbitrator or Governmental Authority is 
pending or, to the knowledge of the Authority or the 
City, is threatened by or against the Authority or the 
City (i) with respect to or affecting this Agreement, 
the Bonds or any Related Documents or any of the trans-
actions contemplated hereby or thereby, or (ii) in 
which there is a reasonable possibility of an adverse 
determination that would materially adversely affect 
the ability of the Authority or the City to meet their 
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respective obligations hereunder and under the Bonds 
and the Related Documents, other than proceedings 
before the PSC as referred to in Section 7.1 of this 
Agreement, and other than that threatened litigation 
referred to in a letter, dated July 17, 1991, from 
Haley & Stoleberger, representing Paulina Flint and 
others, to the White City Water Company Board of Direc-
tors, a copy of which has been delivered to all parties 
hereto. 
(f) Neither the Authority nor the City will take 
any action or fail to take any action needed to be 
taken which would impair (i) the exemption of interest 
on the Bonds from federal income taxation and Utah 
individual income taxation or (ii) the treatment of the 
sale of the Shares by the Shareholders as an install-
ment sale for federal and state income tax purposes. 
(g) Neither the Authority nor the City will make 
an election under Section 338 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended, without the express written 
consent of the Shareholders. 
Section 4.3 Further Representations and Warranties of 
the Authority. The Authority further represents and warrants to 
the Shareholders that: 
(a) Each of the representations and warranties of 
the Authority set forth in the Related Documents are 
true and correct and are hereby made to the Sharehold-
ers as if set forth in full herein. 
(b) Each of the representations and warranties of 
the Authority set forth herein and in the Bonds and 
Related Documents will be true and correct on the date 
of Closing. 
Section 4.4 Further Representations and Warranties of 
the City. The City further represents and warrants to the Share-
holders as follows: 
(a) The City is a duly organized and validly 
existing city of the second class under the laws of the 
State. 
(b) The execution and delivery of this Agreement 
and each of the Related Documents and other agreements, 
instruments, certificates and documents to be executed 
and delivered by the City in connection with this 
transaction have been (or will be prior to Closing) 
duly authorized by all necessary action of the City. 
(c) This Agreement, the Related Documents and any 
other agreements or instruments to be executed by the 
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City, when executed and delivered by the City and 
assuming due authorization, execution and delivery 
thereof by the other parties thereto, will constitute 
legal, valid and binding obligations of the City 
enforceable against the City in accordance with their 
terms, subject to the qualifications that enforceabil-
ity may be limited by applicable bankruptcy, insol-
vency, reorganization, moratorium or similar laws 
affecting the enforcement of creditors' rights and by 
general principles of equity. 
(d) Each of the representations and warranties of 
the City set forth in the Related Documents are true 
and correct and are hereby made to the Shareholders as 
if set forth in full herein. 
(e) Each of the representations and warranties of 
the City set forth herein and in the Related Documents 
will be true and correct on the date of Closing. 
ARTICLE V. ADDITIONAL COVENANTS AND AGREEMENTS 
Section 5.1 Additional Covenants and Agreements of the 
Shareholders. The Shareholders, each for himself or herself, 
agree and covenant that: 
(a) They will deliver the Closing Date Audited 
Financial Statements to the Authority and the City 
within a reasonable time, but not less than 
seventy-five (75) days after the Closing. 
(b) While good faith negotiations are progress-
ing, but no later than the date set for the Closing, 
neither the Company nor the Shareholders will solicit 
or pursue negotiations for the possible sale of the 
Shares or the Company to or with any other parties. 
The Company will not dispose of or encumber any of its 
assets, nor enter into any obligations greater than 
$10,000, without the written concurrence of the Author-
ity and the City. 
(c) Prior to Closing, the Company will provide to 
the Authority and the City access to all records of the 
Company including, but not limited to, records evidenc-
ing compliance with all governmental regulations, 
financial obligations of the Company, any outstanding 
lawsuits in which the Company is involved, employment 
and other contracts to which the Company is a party, 
and evidence that one hundred percent (100%) of the 
stock of the Company, as represented by the Shares, is 
held by the Shareholders. 
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Section 5.2 Additional Covenants and Agreements of the 
Authority and the Citv. The Authority and the City, each for 
itself, agree and covenant that: 
(a) Interest on the Bonds shall be exempt from 
federal income taxation and Utah individual income tax-
ation and opinions of Bond Counsel stating these facts 
and conclusions shall be delivered to each of the 
Shareholders receiving any such bonds at the time they 
are delivered to such Shareholders. 
(b) In order to protect the security of the Bond-
holders represented by the pledge of and lien on the 
Shares and the lien on the System pursuant to the 
Related Documents, the Authority and the City agree, 
while any of the Bonds are outstanding, that: 
(i) neither the City nor the Authority will, 
without the prior written consent of the Share-
holders holding a majority of the Shares, merge, 
consolidate or liquidate the Company, or encumber, 
transfer or otherwise dispose of or cancel the 
Shares, or, except in the usual course of business 
and then only if, and limited to the extent that, 
it benefits the System, encumber, transfer or oth-
erwise dispose of the assets of the Company, in an 
aggregate amount not exceeding $15,000, or take 
any other action, or fail to take any reasonable 
action needed to be taken, which would impair the 
Security. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the 
Shareholders acknowledge and agree that the 
Authority and/or the City has the right to utilize 
the System, including the water rights therein, on 
an annual lease basis from the Company upon such 
terms as the Company may determine; provided that 
any failure to make payments under such lease 
shall be an "Event of Default" under Section 
6.1(b) of the Indenture; provided further that, 
upon the failure of the City to make such lease 
payments, the Authority shall take all actions 
required by law or otherwise to cause such lease 
to be completely terminated with no remaining 
obligations on the part of the lessor or successor 
thereto not later than the end of the sixty (60) 
day period referred to in Section 6.1(b). 
(ii) any new water connections made in the 
area shown on Exhibit D attached hereto shall be 
made to the System and shall be deemed incorpo-
rated within the System/ 
(iii) the Company, City and the Authority 
will maintain and operate the System under the 
same standards and level of maintenance as the 
City applies to its water system and as required 
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under all applicable governmental 'rules and regu-
lations; and 
(iv) the Company, the City and the Authority 
will take all actions necessary or otherwise 
appropriate and as required by law to protect and 
preserve all water rights held by the Company on 
the date of Closing. 
(c) Any new connections, improvements, additions 
or extensions to the System shall be deemed incorpo-
rated into the System, with no rights of any kind with 
respect thereto to be retained by the City or the 
Authority in the event the Shareholders should be 
required to foreclose their liens and security inter-
ests in the Shares and the System and repossess the 
same. 
(d) In the event that ownership of the Shares 
and/or the System is returned to the Shareholders or 
the Trustee because of any default or other action or 
inaction by the City or the Authority under the Bonds, 
this Agreement or the Related Documents, and regardless 
whether such return is brought about by foreclosure or 
other legal proceedings or otherwise, the Authority and 
the City (i) will take all reasonable actions as shall 
be necessary or appropriate to restore to the Share-
holders their rights and privileges in the Shares of 
the Company and all of their rights and privileges with 
respect to the System, including, such rights and priv-
ileges that existed as of the date of Closing, provided 
that the foregoing shall not serve to limit additional 
rights and privileges to which the Company or the 
Shareholders may be entitled under the terms of this 
Agreement, the Bonds, or the Related Documents; 
(ii) will provide water storage facilities to the Com-
pany as the case may be; (iii) to the extent permitted 
by law, will forfeit the interest of the Authority and 
the City in the Shares and the System; and (iv) will 
vote any of the Shares in which the City or the Author-
ity is legally entitled to retain an interest to elect 
directors nominated by the Shareholders. 
(e) The Company, Authority and City shall 
endeavor to retain the Employees with the same poli-
cies, benefits and other employee procedures as apply 
to other similarly situated employees of the City. 
(f) After the Authority purchases the Shares, the 
Company, Authority and the City will honor the prior 
commitment of the Company to provide up to one hundred 
(100) residential water connections to the Magna 
Investment & Development, Ltd., at nine hundred 
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ninety five dollars ($995) per connection, six of which 
will be provided to White Investment Company on Lots 1 
through 6 of White City Number 53 Subdivision. The 
obligation to honor such commitment shall continue for 
the period beginning on the date of Closing and ending 
on the second anniversary of such date. 
VI. EVENTS OF DEFAULT: REMEDIES 
Section 6.1 Events of Default. Each of the following 
events shall constitute and is referred to in this Agreement as 
an "Event of Default": 
(a) a failure by the City to make when due any 
Lease Payment, which failure shall have resulted in an 
"Event of Default" under the Indenture; 
(b) a failure by any party hereto to pay when due 
any amount required to be paid by the party under this 
Agreement or to observe and perform any covenant, con-
dition or agreement on its part to be observed or per-
formed (other than a failure described in clause (a) of 
this Section), which failure shall continue for a 
period of sixty (60) days (or such longer period as the 
non-defaulting party or parties may agree to in writ-
ing, the Trustee being authorized to act for the Bond-
holders for such purpose) after written notice, speci-
fying such failure and requesting that it be remedied, 
shall have been given to the defaulting party or par-
ties by any one or more of the non-defaulting party or 
parties; provided that if such failure is other than 
for the payment of money and is of such nature that it 
cannot be corrected within the applicable period, such 
failure shall not constitute an "Event of Default" so 
long as the defaulting party or parties institute cor-
rective action within the applicable period and such 
action is being diligently pursued; 
(c) any event of default under the Indenture; 
(d) any event of default under any of the other 
Related Documents; 
(e) the dissolution or liquidation of the Author-
ity or the City; or the filing by the Authority or the 
City of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy; or failure 
by the Authority or the City promptly to lift or bond 
any execution, garnishment or attachment of such conse-
quence as will impair its ability to make any payments 
under this Agreement; or the filing of a Petition or 
answer proposing the entry of an order for relief by a 
court of competent jurisdiction against the Authority 
or the City under Title 11 of the United States Code, 
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as the same may from time to time be he'reafter amended, 
or proposing the reorganization, arrangement or debt 
readjustment of the Authority or the City under the 
provisions of any bankruptcy act or under any similar 
act which may be hereafter enacted and the failure of 
said petition or answer to be discharged or denied 
within ninety (90) days after the filing thereof; or 
the entry of an order for relief by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction in any proceeding for the Authority's 
or the City's liquidation or reorganization under the 
provisions of any bankruptcy act or under any similar 
act which may be hereafter enacted; or an assignment by 
the Authority or the City for the benefit of its credi-
tors; or the entry by the Authority or the City into an 
agreement of composition with its creditors. 
Section 6.2 Remedies. 
(a) Upon the occurrence and continuance of any 
Event of Default, the non-defaulting party or parties 
(the Trustee being authorized to act for the Bondhold-
ers for this purpose) may take any action at law or in 
equity to collect any payments then due and thereafter 
to become due hereunder or to seek injunctive relief or 
specific performance of any obligation, agreement or 
covenant hereunder. 
(b) No remedy conferred upon or reserved to any 
party hereby is intended to be exclusive of any other 
available remedy or remedies, but each and every such 
remedy shall be cumulative and shall be in addition to 
every other remedy given hereunder or now or hereafter 
existing at law or in equity or by statute. No delay 
or omission to exercise any right or power accruing 
upon any Event of Default shall impair any such right 
or power or shall be construed to be a waiver thereof, 
but any such right or power may be exercised from time 
to time and as often as may be deemed expedient. In 
order to entitle a party to exercise any remedy 
reserved to it in this Article VI, it shall not be nec-
essary to give any notice, other than such notice as 
may be herein expressly required. 
(c) If any party shall employ attorneys or incur 
other reasonable and proper expenses for the collection 
of payments due hereunder or for the enforcement of 
performance or observance of any obligation or agree-
ment hereunder on the part of another party or parties 
hereto, the defaulting party or parties shall reimburse 
the non-defaulting party for the reasonable and proper 
fees of such attorneys and such other reasonable 
expenses so incurred. 
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(d) In the event any obligation created hereby 
shall be breached by any of the parties hereto and such 
breach shall thereafter be waived by the other party or 
parties, such waiver shall be limited to the particular 
breach so waived and shall not be deemed to waive any 
other breach hereunder. 
Section 6.3 Limitations on the Bonds and Lease and 
Assiqnment Obiigat ion. 
(a) The Bonds are issued under and pursuant to 
the Act and shall be limited and not general obliga-
tions of the Authority payable solely out of the Reve-
nues. No holder of any Bond has the right to compel 
any exercise of the taxing power of the City to pay the 
principal of, or premium, if any, on the Bonds when due 
and the interest thereon, or the purchase price of any 
Bond. The Bonds shall not constitute or give rise to a 
pecuniary liability of the Authority or constitute an 
indebtedness of or a charge against the general credit 
of the Authority or a loan of credit thereof within the 
meaning of any constitutional or statutory provisions 
of the State. The Authority has no tax power. Neither 
the Authority nor any member or officer of the Author-
ity nor any person executing the Bonds shall be liable 
personally on the Bonds or be subject to any personal 
liability or accountability by reason of the issuance 
of the Bonds. 
(b) The Authority's payment obligations under the 
Bonds shall be limited to and payable exclusively from 
the Revenues and the Security, including the Lease Pay-
ments which shall be a current expense of the City pay-
able exclusively from City funds to the extent they are 
budgeted and annually appropriated for such purpose by 
the City Council. The City Council shall be under no 
obligation to provide such funds if not appropriated in 
the City's final budget, neither shall the City be 
obligated to make such appropriation. The Bonds shall 
be limited obligations of the Authority, payable solely 
out of the Revenues received by the Authority under the 
Lease and Assignment and from the other Security. Pur-
suant to the Act, the Bonds shall be secured by the 
Security which shall be specially mortgaged, pledged, 
hypothecated, assigned and otherwise secured pursuant 
to the Related Documents for the equal and ratable pay-
ment of the principal of and interest on the Bonds. 
Neither the full faith and credit nor the taxing power 
of the Authority or the City are pledged to the payment 
of the principal of or interest on the Bonds. The 
Bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness of the 
Authority or the City within the meaning of any state 
constitutional provision or limitation nor give rise to 
a general obligation or liability of, nor a charge 
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against, the general or taxing powers of the Authority 
or the City (the Authority has no tax powers) • The 
Lease and Assignment will provide that the City, as 
lessee, will include in its annual appropriation 
request to the City Council, the amount necessary to 
pay the annual Lease Payments under the Lease and 
Assignment and that if the City fails to pay such 
annual Lease Payments within the cure time period pro-
vided for Events of Default as defined under the Lease 
and Assignment, it shall immediately quit and vacate 
the System and its annual Lease Payment obligation 
thereunder shall terminate. No deficiency judgment may 
be entered against the Authority or the City on fore-
closure of any.lien created by the Related Documents or 
otherwise securing the Bonds. Neither the State, the 
City, or any other political subdivision, board, com-
mission, agency or department of the State, other than 
the Authority, will be obligated to pay the principal 
of, or interest on, the Bonds. 
ARTICLE VII. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING 
Prior to Closing, the following shall have occurred: 
Section 7.1 PSC Order. The PSC shall have issued an 
order which has become final and non-appealable, acceptable to 
the City, in its sole discretion, including at least the follow-
ing : 
(a) authorizing the sale of the Shares by the 
Shareholders to the Authority; 
(b) confirming that subsequent to the Closing the 
PSC will not have jurisdiction over the rates, fees, 
charges, services or practices of the Company, the 
Authority or the City as a result of the purchase of 
the Shares by the Authority, or the lease of the System 
by the City under the Lease and Assignment; and 
(c) contain no restrictions or conditions on pos-
sible reorganizations of the Company, including a 
requirement to liquidate the Company. 
Section 7.2 Documents to be Provided By the Company to 
the Authority and the City. The Company shall have provided to 
the Authority and the City for their examination, originals or 
true copies of the following: 
(a) documents which establish the Company's own-
ership of all water rights utilized by the Company; 
(b) salary schedules for the employees of the 
Company; and 
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(c) the documents establishing the Company's com-
mitment for water connections to Magna Investment & 
Development, Ltd., referred to in Section 5.2(f), 
VIII. DOCUMENTS TO BE DELIVERED AT CLOSING 
At Closing, executed originals or photocopies of the 
following documents shall be delivered to each of the parties and 
their representatives, as shown on the Closing Memorandum for 
this transaction to be prepared by Bond Counsel: 
(1) this Agreement; 
(2) the Indenture; 
(3) the Lease and Assignment; 
(4) the Deed of Trust and Security Agreement; 
(5) the Stock Pledge Agreement; 
(6) a certified copy of the PSC Order; 
(7) an unqualified opinion of Bond Counsel stating 
that each of the Bonds and Related Documents are valid and 
legally binding obligations of and are enforceable against the 
Authority and the City, as applicable, and that interest on the 
Bonds (excluding the interest to the extent of the four percent 
(4%) increase over the Stated Interest Rate for the Bonds for 
late payments described in Section 2.5(d) hereof) is exempt from 
federal income taxation and Utah individual income taxes; 
(8) the opinion of counsel described in Section 3.1; 
(9) all other documents listed in the Closing 
Memorandum; 
(10) certified copies of the Articles of Incorporation 
of the Company, together with all amendments to date, and the 
minute books of the meetings of the Board of Directors and the 
Shareholders of the Company (including all written actions taken 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. SS 16-10-40 and 16-10-138 by the 
Shareholders and Directors of the Company without a meeting) com-
plete to the date of Closing; and 
(11) the Audited Financial Statements, including the 
report of the Company's auditors which report shall be prepared 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and 
practices consistently applied. 
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IX. TERMINATION 
In the event the transaction contemplated by this 
Agreement and the Related Documents does not close on the date of 
Closing, as may be extended in writing by mutual agreement of the 
parties hereto, this Agreement shall terminate and have no fur-
ther force or effect, except as provided in Section 10.11. 
X. MISCELLANEOUS 
Section 10.1 Conf ident ialitv. The Authority and the 
City agree to keep all records, documents and other information 
(written or oral) delivered or otherwise disclosed to either of 
them by the Company or the Shareholders strictly confidential and 
not to reveal, deliver or otherwise disclose any of such records, 
documents or other information, in whole or in part, to any other 
person, except as required by law, and provided that all resolu-
tions of the City Council and the Authority pertaining to the 
transactions contemplated herein, and any public transcript of 
proceedings regarding the Bonds shall be matters of public record 
open for public inspection. The provisions of this Section shall 
survive termination of this Agreement. 
Section 10.2 Limited IndemnifIcat ion . The Sharehold-
ers agree to indemnify and hold harmless the Company, the Author-
ity and the City against all back taxes of the Company, includ-
ing, but not limited to, income, property, sales, use, excise or 
other taxes, if any, and interest and penalties related to such 
back taxes, if any, to the extent that any such back taxes, 
interest or penalties arise from taxable events occurring within 
and are attributable to any period prior to the date of Closing 
except for taxes accruing for the current year as disclosed in 
the Closing Date Audited Financial Statements. It is understood 
and agreed that all taxes of any kind and nature, whether imposed 
or sought to be imposed on the Company, the Authority, the City 
or any of the Shareholders, arising from taxable events, includ-
ing but not limited to a liquidation of the Company, occurring on 
or after the date of Closing are the responsibility of the Com-
pany, the Authority or City each of which hereby agrees to indem-
nify and hold harmless each of the Shareholders from and against 
all such taxes, except for any taxes imposed on the Shareholders 
as a result of the sale of the Shares. 
Section 10.3 Assignment of Security. The Authority 
(and the City, as appropriate), shall assign to the Trustee, for 
the benefit of the Bondholders, all of its right, title and 
interest in or to the Security in order to create and perfect the 
right, title and interest of the Trustee therein as secured party 
for the benefit of the Bondholders. 
Section 10.4 Further Assurances. Each of the parties 
to this Agreement shall execute and deliver or cause to be exe-
cuted and delivered any and all documents or legal instruments 
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necessary to carry out the provisions of this Agreement and the 
transaction contemplated hereby. 
Section 10.5 Binding Effect. This Agreement shall 
take effect immediately and shall be binding upon the parties 
hereto and their successors and assigns. 
Section 10.6 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be 
governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
Section 10.7 Modifications. This Agreement may not be 
modified, amended, altered or supplemented except by a written 
agreement or other instrument signed by the parties hereto. 
Section 10.8 Headings. Headings in this Agreement are 
for convenience of reference only and shall not affect the con-
struction or interpretation of this Agreement. 
Section 10.9 Severabi1ity. In the event any provision 
of this Agreement is found to be unenforceable or invalid, such 
provision shall be severable from this Agreement to the extent 
that it is a provision which is not essential and the absence of 
which would not have prevented the parties from entering into 
this Agreement. 
Section 10.10 Counterparts. This Agreement may be 
executed in counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an 
original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the 
same document. 
Section 10.11 Survival of Provisions. The provisions 
of Sections 4.2(f) and (g), and 10.1 and 10.2 hereof shall sur-
vive termination of this Agreement. 
Section 10.12 Not ices. All notices provided by this 
Agreement shall be given by the appropriate party or parties to 
the other party or parties hereto at the following addresses or 
to such other address or addresses of any party hereto as may 
hereafter be designated in writing by such other party and deliv-
ered to the other parties: 
If to the Authority: Mayor 
Sandy City 
440 E. 8680 So. 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Lee Kapaloski 
Parsons Behle & 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, 
Latimer 
UT 84147 
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If to the City: 
If to the Shareholders: 
Mayor 
Sandy City 
440 E. 8680 So. 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Lee Kapaloski 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
John E. Papanikolas 
2210 Walker Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Ronald J. Ockey 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough 
170 So. Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
If to the Trustee: K i m Galbraith 
Vice President and Manager, 
Corporate Trust 
West One Trust Company 
107 South Main Street, Suite 3< 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Section 10.13 Purchase of System Subject to Approval 
by the Authority and the City Council of the City. The purchase 
of the System by the Authority and the related transactions con-
templated herein is subject to the approval of the Authority and 
the City Council of the City. 
DATED this day of (JPJs^f>€<_ , 1991. 
SANDY CITY, UTAH 
LARRY SMITH, MAYOR 
COUNTERSIGNED AND ATTESTED: 
ASSISTANT CITY RECORDER 
cudddz-
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[Authority Seal] 
ATTEST: 
SECRETARY 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING OWNERSHIP 
AUTHORITY OF SANDY CITY, UTAH 
^^^iSW^- V ^ ^ ^ ^ > ^ -
CHAIRMAN 
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF WHITE CITY 
WATER COMPANY, INC. 
; C ^ ^ &/-vt-VV- uy 
JOHN E. PAPANIKOLAS 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
Trustee of the Nick E. Papanikolas 
Trust 
MARK E. PAPANIKOLAS . f 
^PAPANIKOLAS ~ 
b >** • r*ywcL 
WILLIAM MT/PAPANIKDLAS 
^
V 
CHRISTINE7 PAPAN
JOHN G. PAPANIKOLAS 
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-^ /ktul -r/J5C4//s Ay *$u,7f. tifaL &-***» 
GLORIA w.' HALLIDAX/ Personal 
Representative of the Ada Marie 
White Estate. 
JOYCES W. JACKSON 
L/ 
tiiSs, •tC/.(Wa.^jA< 
GLORIA W. HALLIDAY 
CM 
HER&ERT H. HALLIDAY 
^ isi. '• 
INGRID E. HALLIDAY 
HART H. HALLIDAY 
LAURA H. PARKER 
JOHN PARKER 
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THE SHAREHOLDERS OF WHITE CITY 
WATER COMPANY, INC. 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
Trustee of the Nick E. Papanikolas 
Trust 
MARK E. PAPANIKOLAS ~ 
CHRI ST INE /PAPANI KOLAS -^ 7. 77 
t-^ <>*7 .L* 7^c<_^f-
W ILL I AM M.' PAPANIKOLAS 
'// 
& 
•HN G. PAPANIKOLAS 
ti*.7//-W4.4U 
GLORIA W. HALLIDA 
Representative of 
White Estate 
a Marie 
lENNETH F". WHITE 
JOYCE/W. JACKSON 
L ^ 
JAR 
•/l fm/ 
d k. JkdyHoH ' ' 
V ^ftWat" // / W/ fr A 
GLORIA W. HALLfDAY 
^U 
(-• / / . / , • Ui /.Ms/t, A/st//A sS\/Z. L 
HERfrERT, H. HALLIDAY 
imJj 
HALLIDAY 
SH /Mil 
ART H. HALLIDAY 
£ UAS\S^ / V. ray^^A, 
LAURA H. PARKER 
tb* y&Jh<i_. 
JOHN/PARKER 
HEATHER H. ALGER 
-^^ V^ -^y/^  ^ n l ^ . 
GARY AtGER 
-N/ f'iA/-<,i /9j—(Ju<iv<eY) 
TERESA H. CLAWSON 
GLA COY WSON 
GREGORY W. HALLIDAY 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING 
AUTHORITY OF SANDY CITY, UTAH 
[Authority Seal] 
ATTEST: 
SECRETARY CHAIRMAN 
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF WHITE CITY 
WATER COMPANY, INC. 
JOHN E. PAPANIKOLAS 
GARY H. WHITE 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
Trustee of the Nick E. Papanikolas 
Trust 
MARK E. PAPANIKOLAS 
CHRISTINE PAPANIKOLAS 
WILLIAM M. PAPANIKOLAS 
JOHN G. PAPANIKOLAS 
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